



1717–1790s	1780–1781	1791–1804	1807–1808	April 19, 1810	May 1810
Bourbon reforms	Túpac Amaru rebellion in Andes	Haitian revolution	Napoleon invades Iberian Peninsula, installs his brother on Spanish throne	Cabildo of Caracas deposes Spanish governor, establishes Caracas Junta	Revolution in Argentina
August 24, 1821	September 7, 1822	August 6, 1825	1829–1830		
Treaty of Córdoba recognizes Mexican Independence	Pedro, son of Portuguese King, declares Brazilian independence and is Crowned Emperor of Brazil on December.	Bolivian independence	Dissolution of Gran Colombia		

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# Independence Narratives, Past and Present

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September 16, 1810	December 15, 1812	1815	July 9, 1816	February–July, 1819	July 28, 1821
Grito de Dolores by Father Miguel Hidalgo (Mexico)	Simón Bolívar announces support of independence in Cartagena Manifesto	Brazil made co-kingdom with Portugal	Congress of Tucumán declares Argentine independence	Congress of Angostura leads to creation of Gran Colombia	Peruvian Declaration of Independence. Struggles with royalist forces would continue until 1824

The Shot Heard Round the World  
Was the Start of the Revolution  
The Minutemen were Ready  
On the Move<sup>1</sup>

In what seems like the stone age of television, millions of North American schoolchildren once spent their Saturday mornings watching *Schoolhouse Rock*, a series of public service announcements that occasionally interrupted their cartoons. They learned about grammar, math, civics, and science from the program. They were also subjected to a series of lessons about a seminal moment in the national past. The best among the history lessons, the “Shot Heard Round the World,” was a delightfully entertaining rendering of Paul Revere’s ride, in which children learned that “we” kicked out the British Redcoats in order to “let freedom reign.” It was also a clever work of propaganda. Independence was narrated not as the birth of the United States (there was, after all, already a “we” and a “British,” and a pre-existing history covered in another episode called “No More Kings”), but as a moment in which Americans acted out preexisting values through the violent expulsion of tyrants.

*Schoolhouse Rock*’s rendering of U.S. independence works as history because in the aftermath of the war (a war which in some ways was many different wars, fought in several

different colonies) those colonies created a common government, which in turn successfully promoted the belief that North Americans shared a common national history. That national government also endeavored to promote a vision of independence that held that the war was right and just, that the English colonists living here were more American than European, that they were being oppressed by people with whom they shared few common values, and that having escaped religious persecution in Europe more than a century before, it was their destiny to demand political freedom.

There were, of course, silences in this narrative. The “shot heard round the world” story ignores the fact that those who won their freedom were overwhelmingly white male property owners and that women did not gain the right to vote in most of the country until the twentieth century. It overlooks the fact that not all settlers came to the colonies because of religious discrimination, that many atrocities were committed in the name of independence, and that tens of thousands of people who were born in the colonies and no less American than their neighbors who lost their property and community standing after the war because they supported the losing side. It also, of course, ignores other significant silences, such as the role of indigenous peoples in the story, and the fact that the compromise that eventually produced a United States of America actively denied freedom for the majority of those of African origin, a compromise that in turn was partially responsible for a fratricidal conflict that seven decades later, would cost over 600,000 lives.

Those silences remain in the shadows when Americans today celebrate the Fourth of July, largely ignored in favor of the narrative reproduced in *Schoolhouse Rock*. For all its limitations, the nationalist narrative, reinforced by the state, its educational institutions, and generation after generation of repetitions in literature, art, music, and the movies (not to mention Saturday morning cartoons), continues to privilege the story of the heroic individuals who fought for American freedom.

The power of the story is instructive of the challenge that confronts us when we try to produce a similarly straightforward understanding of independence in the Spanish, Portuguese, and French colonies that lay to the south of the thirteen British colonies that formed the United States of America. There was no “shot heard round the world” to signal a struggle for Latin American independence, in part because there was no single war for Latin American independence. It is difficult to narrate the history of the French, Spanish, English, Dutch, and Portuguese colonies that comprised this part of the world in a way that sets up independence as the logical or inevitable culmination of a national destiny—a story of freedom or otherwise. No single nation with the capacity to control the narrative emerged out of this region’s battle for independence. The battles lasted longer, represented an even greater diversity of interests and claims, and yielded no consistent outcome. We must wonder then, could there be a *Schoolhouse Rock* version of Latin American independence? Where would it begin? What would be its lesson?

## The Problem of Beginnings

The first problem we encounter in trying to narrate Latin American independence lies on the national level. Mexicans, Argentines, Brazilians, Chileans, and residents of other societies in the region all have their own national independence narratives, and they often differ a great

deal, not just in the military heroes they venerate, but in the underlying values these stories inculcate. Mexicans for instance, lionize a liberal priest (Father Miguel Hidalgo). Brazilians claim a slave owning aristocrat (Dom Pedro I). Venezuelans, Colombians, and Peruvians credit an autocrat (Simón Bolívar) as the “Great Liberator,” a reference to the fact that he led the military coalition that ultimately drove the Spanish out of their last footholds in South America. Some Bolivians (whose country is named for the Great Liberator) also celebrate Bolívar, but others in this country also venerate Túpac Katari, an Ayamara leader who died in a rebellion against the Spanish more than forty years before independence. Their divided loyalties offer different perspectives on where we should begin and end the story of this era.

As the Bolivian case suggests, the type of independence narrative we choose depends upon what sorts of actors we privilege. Told from the perspective of European descended elite males (*criollos*), independence was often a story of bravery and sacrifice in the name of ideals (national independence, freedom, self-determination). Told from the perspective of elite women, it was often a much more ambivalent story of frustrated ambitions (see the story of Manuela Sáenz, Bolívar’s lover and savior, on this account<sup>2</sup>). Indigenous peoples often opposed these local leaders, fearing that self-determination for colonial elites would signal ruin for themselves, as those same colonial elites were their worst exploiters. African-descended slaves had similarly complex views, supporting a variety of sides in the conflicts depending on where individual and collective opportunities for emancipation seemed to lie.

These challenges might lead us to abandon both the idea of a common independence narrative and a sense that there can be a common story of Latin America. Yet if we do this, we risk losing sight of what seems to be a significant fact: between 1790 and 1830 almost every colony in the Americas (excepting Canada, Cuba, and a small number of other colonies in or bordering the Caribbean) violently dispossessed their European rulers. A shared history of colonial rule marked all of these societies and left common legacies and challenges for most. Moreover, the battles for independence connected societies across the region. News of rebellions in one colony spread to others, as did rebel and imperial armies. The fact that different parts of the region were under the control of different empires also facilitated the process, as rebel leaders could flee from their home to the colony of another European Empire (thus Bolívar’s *Letter from Jamaica*, excerpted below), and could at times enlist the support of the European enemies of their colonial overlords. This, of course, was possible because during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries Europe was consumed by the Napoleonic Wars, leaving the governments of the old world without the wherewithal to fully dominate their colonies.

These phenomena leave us with a series of uncomfortable choices. If we choose one independence narrative, we are given a chance to imagine a common Latin American past at the risk of silencing other, equally valid ways of understanding this history. If we choose too many narratives, we do greater justice to personal and local stories at the risk of losing a larger view of Latin America in the cacophony. My response to this dilemma is two-fold. Below I will tell three stories of independence instead of one. And rather than considering independence as a series of personages and events that need to be remembered and venerated, the sections that follow focus on the ways that independence is narrated—the morals and messages that are usually invoked through the story of Latin American independence.

## Stories of Freedom

On November 4, 1780, in the Andean town of Tinta, Túpac Amaru II (José Gabriel Candorcanqui) seized the local Spanish Governor, Antonio de Arriaga, and ordered that he be put on trial. Executing de Arriaga a week later, he declared a rebellion against the Spanish Empire. His rebellion failed, leading to his death and the deaths of thousands of his compatriots. Though short lived, the cathartic (or alternately, frightening) power of his rebellion resonates in much of Latin America to this day. In part because he took his name from the last Inca ruler to be conquered by the Spaniards, and in part because his rebellion took as its goal the elimination of Spaniards from the Americas, the 1780 revolt has long stood for the complete rejection of the evils of the race-based oppression that colonialism and its aftermath entailed. It has been an inspiration to revolutionaries and those battling inequality across the hemisphere.

Colonial Latin Americans lived in unfree and unequal societies, and while most struggled against the injustices they faced in limited ways, stealing from landlords, occasionally poisoning their bosses, Europe's colonies in the Americas saw their share of spectacularly violent uprisings. Indigenous peoples (locked in a caste system that offered limited rights and made many demands) and slaves (who lacked legal personhood) were the most unfree, and led the most impressive struggles. The Caste War in the Yucatán in 1712, millenarian revolts in the Andes like the one sparked by Túpac Amaru II, and the vast communities of escaped slaves that flourished from Brazil to the Caribbean (the largest, Palmares, survived in Brazil from 1605 to 1694) acted as repeated reminders that those most oppressed by the colonial system were never all that far from responding to the violence of the system with violence of their own. At their extreme, these movements envisioned a world without Spaniards, Portuguese, and other colonial overlords. They banished Europeans, their languages, and their food in their effort to return to a distant, utopian past. Nonetheless, as they were fighting against colonial states that were much stronger than them, most struggles for freedom in colonial Latin America were ultimately defeated; that is, until Haitian slaves took on the most powerful European nation of the day in 1791.

If we narrate independence as a story about freedom, Haiti (St. Domingue) is a good place to begin. During the 1780s, St. Domingue accounted for 40 percent of France's foreign trade, and was arguably the richest colony in Latin America, producing two-fifths of the world's sugar and half the world's coffee, virtually the entire volume of each produced by a slave population that reached a half million at its peak. A glimpse of the island in 1791 would reveal hundreds of thousands of recently enslaved Africans, persons who had been born free and longed for emancipation. One would also see a small but significant number of free people of color on the island, individuals who were increasingly important to the islands economy. Some owned slaves and supported slavery, though they chafed at the fact that the revolutionary Estates General of the French Revolution denied them political rights.

It was in this context that a slave revolt in 1791 metastasized into a civil war, and then a colonial war, leaving the island's white planters unable to defend their possessions. Slave emancipation came in 1793, when a French appointed governor (Léger-Félicité Sonthonax) used the promise of freedom for the slaves to recruit them into an army that could re-establish French control over the island. Eleven years later, after a decade more of civil strife, occupations by British, French, and Spanish armies, and numerous attempts to re-establish slavery

on the island, Haitians won their independence. Theirs was the first republic in the Americas to ban slavery.

Events in St. Domingue had an impact elsewhere. Slave uprisings in the Spanish colonies (e.g., Coro, Venezuela, in 1795) followed news of St. Domingue. Planters around the Caribbean responded in kind, increasing discipline on their estates and mercilessly punishing even the hint of slave resistance. When war broke out in the Spanish colonies just a few years later, slavery was on many people's minds. Some slaves, like Juan Izaguirre in the Valle de Onato in Venezuela, appropriated the language of criollo liberators to claim their own freedom. Others opted for loyalty to Spain when this seemed a likelier route to freedom. Slaves defended Buenos Aires against the British Invasion in 1806–1807 and supported the royalist forces in large numbers in return for promises of rights and freedoms (commonly the right to be treated as a Spaniard). Not to be outdone, several rebel governments (*juntas*) outlawed the slave trade and passed (post-dated) free womb laws<sup>3</sup> (Santiago in 1811, Buenos Aires in April 1812, and Lima in 1821). The Venezuelan rebel Francisco Miranda, who was personally opposed to slavery, offered slaves freedom in return for ten years of military service. Bolívar, who followed Miranda as a leading figure in Venezuelan revolutionary circles (and who was a member of the group that arrested Miranda and turned him over to the Spanish), actively recruited slaves beginning in 1816, and would not have succeeded without drawing them away from the royalist cause.

Miranda, Bolívar, and the other rebel leaders who openly opposed slavery have come to be known as Latin America's early liberals. This term was bandied about constantly during the nineteenth century, used to describe any number of political movements that identified with progress and against tradition. Liberals called for greater freedom, sometimes individual freedom and equality before the law, sometimes the elimination of government imposed trade restrictions, and often an end to the power of the corporate entities that characterized colonial society—the Church, the nobility, the military, and the communal Indian village (the latter because liberals believed that communal land tenure restricted the free circulation of private property and thus limited economic growth).

Other stories of freedom in the region are similarly complex. In Mexico, Father Miguel Hidalgo's followers responded to his *Grito de Dolores* by raising a rag-tag army that swept through the Bajío in late 1810. Unlike earlier movements in the Andes, Hidalgo's armies were multiethnic, composed mainly of people who were already, to a certain extent free, but who, after years of drought and declining wages, viewed wealthy Spaniards (particularly grain merchants) as enemies. Some wanted independence, but many simply wanted the king to intercede in their favor. "Death to Spaniards"—the popular slogan they shouted as they marched—did not refer to the king, but his venal surrogates. More complex still, it appears that beyond economic concerns, many of their grievances were the product of eighteenth-century religious reforms, which undermined traditional religious practices in an attempt to enforce Catholic orthodoxy. They demanded a return to the colonial system as they had known it in the past, and restoration of the *old* Spanish King.

Freedom, then, was invoked to justify many different things. It could speak to a desire to escape human bondage, the demand that the avarice of your social betters be constrained, or even be framed as the **right** worship according to the dictates of one's ancestors. And for the liberal merchants of cities like Buenos Aires, Caracas, or Mexico City, it might mean freedom to trade directly with their British partners, the manufacturers of Manchester and

elsewhere who were forced to work through Spanish intermediaries to send their goods to the colonies. What is more, those urban liberals might view freedom in terms that were diametrically opposed to their rural counterparts. An indigenous peasant in Oaxaca might see freedom as freedom from the pressures of outsiders who wanted to appropriate his land, a freedom best defended through the intercession of the king. For the liberal elites, it could very well mean freedom from the laws and regulations that kept that land out of circulation, and thus made it impossible for them to freely acquire these properties.

## Stories of Tradition

Most individuals in the contemporary world chafe at the idea of corporate privilege. We do not generally believe that members of the nobility, military, and clergy should enjoy special privileges, or that rights should be apportioned differently based on one's place of birth. We see those who might defend these privileges as backward at best, and antidemocratic at worst. We can easily understand villagers in the Mexican Bajío revolting because elites were treating them particularly harshly in the context of a famine (1808–1810). It is easy to imagine slaves demanding the right to be free. It makes less sense to us that indigenous people might in fact support colonial rule, defending a system of corporate privileges that seemed to place them at the bottom of the social hierarchy. Nonetheless, this too is an important story of independence.

Indigenous peoples (Indians in colonial parlance) owed service and tribute to the state. They also possessed rights to self-rule, to land, water, timber, and the practice of customary law. Though not always perfectly respected, these rights represented the most powerful currency that most indigenous peoples possessed within colonial society, claims that could be invoked in order to defend individual and community interests against more powerful outsiders, many of whom were politically connected *criollos*. A significant number of indigenous rebellions during the colonial period were efforts to preserve and expand these rights; rebellions in defense of village autonomy. In fact, the Andean rebellions of 1780 were not invariably tied to demands for freedom or equality. They were often the product of efforts to defend local village rights and ensure that royal officials respected local prerogatives. Moreover, it was not simply military repression that brought peace to the Andes in the aftermath of 1780. Long-term peace emerged from a concerted effort by the Spanish state to deal more effectively with local grievances. In part due to these efforts to forge a new colonial pact of domination, this region did not see much violence during the wars for independence. Liberal ideals generally fell on deaf ears here.

Tradition carried a great deal of weight elsewhere in Latin America. Honorable families could trace their propriety back generations. Access to political privilege was decided by lineage. The Catholic Church acted as the social glue, operating schools, hospitals, orphanages, charities, and cemeteries, and dominating social and ecclesiastical life through its calendar. Agents of the Spanish Inquisition policed spiritual life in the colony. If change was in the air—and it was, as more and more Latin Americans read enlightenment thinkers, called themselves liberals, and questioned tradition—the backlash against new ideas was just as strong.

In Mexico, struggles between liberals and traditionalists (conservatives) spawned a decade of civil war and then a compromise at independence. The royalist Agustín de Iturbide

turned on his superiors and joined the struggle for independence in 1821 in a bargain that saw the primacy of the Catholic Church and the unity of the nation preserved. In the Andes, the pull of tradition (and a fear of the power of the masses) would keep many on the royalist side until the region was liberated from the outside in the 1820s.

More powerful still was the claim to tradition in the parts of Latin America where slavery remained a dominant mode of economic production. In order to function, slave societies relied on a series of myths about stability, the power and virtue of the planter, and the natural order of things. Cuban elites, their terror stoked by race war in Haiti, never seriously considered independence in the early nineteenth century. In Brazil, the weight of tradition and the power of aristocracy were critical to the illusion that slavery was anything but an abomination. The Portuguese emperor was a father to the people of Brazil in the same way that the planter was a father to the slave.

This logic explains Brazil's unusual path to independence. Like other regions in the Americas, Brazil experienced its share of late eighteenth-century rebellions (the most famous led by Tiradentes, in 1789), but by a particular turn of fate, these rebellions never became part of a national independence narrative in which Brazilians freed themselves from oppressive and distant colonial rulers. Instead, the distant colonial state came to Brazil and indirectly set off a series of events that would lead to independence. Fleeing the Napoleonic invasion of Portugal, Emperor João VI and 15,000 Portuguese relocated to Rio de Janeiro in 1808. The city quickly became the official center of the Empire, with concomitant increases in trade and investment. Brazil was even formally elevated to the status of co-kingdom in 1815. Still, this newfound prestige did not preclude mounting calls for independence. Rebellions in Pernambuco and elsewhere repeatedly threatened royal authority during these years.

It is difficult to underestimate the role slavery played in Brazilian independence, even if slavery was rarely discussed and never seriously contested. Free Brazilians understood that their society depended on slavery for its economic well-being. This severely limited the appeal of liberalism in Brazil, as a mutual dependence on slavery and a profound antipathy of anyone who might favor emancipation acted to unite Brazilian elites (and many in the middle sectors). For most Brazilians of European ancestry, independence did not seem inherently logical until 1820, when liberal army officers in Portugal rebelled, formed a legislative, a *Cortes*, and called the king home. The liberals in Lisbon then demanded that João bow down before their new constitution and that Brazil bow down before Portugal. They also seemed poised to abolish slavery. When the *Cortes* demanded that Pedro, the king's son and interim ruler in Brazil return home, Pedro refused. He instead declared Brazil independent on September 7, 1822. A series of military skirmishes followed, but Pedro rapidly established a constitutional monarchy under the banner of the Brazilian Empire. Slavery was saved.

## Stories of Nationhood

When did Latin Americans begin to think of themselves as members of national communities, and not as colonial subjects? There are a number of interesting signs from this era. When they rallied behind the flag of rebellion, Mexicans followed the image of the Virgin

of Guadalupe, a markedly local patron saint. Local publishing and literary communities flourished during the independence era, producing a sense of local specificity through the written word. Across the region, intellectuals actively condemned the evils of Spanish colonialism and celebrated incipient national cultures, defining themselves as fundamentally distinct from their colonial overlords. Some even excavated local Indian pasts in order to claim an ancient history for themselves that pre-dated the arrival of Europeans, and to argue that the presence of the Spanish crown in the Americas was pernicious, destructive; that they, like their fictive ancestors, were enslaved.

These rebels did feel connected to Europe. Europeans in the Americas remained powerfully linked to their origins. They returned to Spain or Portugal to be educated. They actively looked for opportunities to marry their daughters to recent arrivals. They followed the fashions and attitudes of the Iberian Peninsula. Nonetheless, by the early nineteenth century *criollo* elites increasingly saw themselves as rooted in the Americas. This sentiment—that they were Americans rather than Europeans—was both the product of their long history in the region and of recent developments, most notably a series of political and economic changes that historians have come to call the Bourbon Reforms. After the Bourbons ascended to the Spanish throne in the early eighteenth century, they gradually implemented new and often unwelcome policies in their American colonies. While local merchants benefited from some of the reforms (such as Bourbon efforts to create more legal avenues for trade), the new royal family collected taxes more aggressively and effectively, increasingly substituted peninsular Spanish officials for local ones, reserved many of the new economic opportunities in the colonies for Spaniards, and disrupted traditional governance in the colonies. *Criollo* grievances steadily accumulated through the century, erupting into rebellion as early as the 1740s.

It is not clear that these grievances were destined to lead to independence. Even if they were drawn to liberal values during this era, *criollos* remained deeply bound to the mother country. Latin American liberalism was hierarchical, favoring individual equality for males of Spanish descent. Few liberals imagined that these same rights ought to extend to the lower castes or women. Moreover, even in the 1810s there was very little of what one might call nationalist sentiment in the region, and elite *criollo* liberals shared little in common with the peasants, Indians, slaves, and *castas* (individuals of a variety of racial mixtures) who labored in the colonies.

Chance intervened in this story in the form of a diminutive Frenchman. Napoleon's invasion of Spain in 1808 threw the Iberian Peninsula into turmoil, and had the effect of bringing the distinction between *criollo* and peninsular Spaniard to the fore in several colonies. Spain did not formally relinquish control of her Latin American colonies, but when Charles IV (the Spanish King) was forced from the throne and replaced by Napoleon's brother Joseph, many in the colonies were not inclined to swear loyalty to the new Emperor. In capital cities across the region, local elites clashed with vice-regal authorities as a multitude of conspiracies flourished. When residents of Buenos Aires learned from sailors aboard a British frigate on May 13, 1810, that Iberia was almost entirely under French rule, they deposed the Spanish Viceroy and formed a *junta*, initiating La Plata's May Revolution. Though the *junta* leaders (among them, Argentine national heroes Cornelio Saavedra, Mariano Moreno, and Manuel Belgrano) declared their loyalty to the authentic Spanish King, they also demanded the right to choose their own Viceroy.

Although La Plata *criollos* clearly wanted to promote their own material interests (e.g., to trade more directly with England), their desires were not limited to financial matters. Members of the First *Junta* already felt an incipient sense of national belonging, which hardened into an unrelenting desire for freedom from Spain through the course of several brutal military campaigns. It was following these battles, and not before (as in the case of the United States) that the rebels made a formal Declaration of Independence from Spain on July 9, 1816. With independence won in the core of the old colony of La Plata, José de San Martín (their chief military leader) expanded his battle against Spanish forces across the continent, fighting into the 1820s.

The ease of initial victory was deceptive. As *criollo* nationalists would quickly discover, it was much easier to imagine a nation than it was to see it come into existence. Elite liberals often shared little more than a desire to be free of the constraints of colonial rule, and turned on one another in internal struggles that resulted in the dissolution of their new nations even as the wars for independence raged around them. Still more complex was their relationship to the popular groups that formed the core of their armies. We lack comprehensive understandings of why poor and marginalized people joined the independence armies, but what we know suggests that their understandings of the struggle and the nations that would come out of it often differed from the views held by elites. Efforts to knit together these disparate passions into unified nations would not yield rapid returns.

## The Documents: Bolivarian Dreams

No single figure is more associated with independence in Latin America than Simón Bolívar. His statue can be found in any major city in the region, and his image is known to schoolchildren everywhere in Latin America. In part his fame is tied to his exploits, especially his role in leading victorious rebel armies across the Andes. His lasting fame however, more clearly derives from his visionary ideals, from his dream that Latin America should stand united against all enemies, his insistence that out of unity would come strength, prosperity, and freedom. Independence in Latin America left many dreams unfulfilled—dreams that in many ways have gone unfulfilled to this day—and Bolívar's dream has been a reference point for that sense of incompleteness for nearly two centuries.

Below are three examples of the Bolivarian dream, each composed roughly a century apart. Each evokes Bolívar's hopes for the region in its own particular way. Document 1.1, an excerpt from Bolívar's *Letter from Jamaica*,<sup>4</sup> offers us an opportunity to consider the Bolivarian dream in its original iteration. Written in the midst of the wars for independence, while Bolívar was briefly exiled in the British island colony, the letter reflects the effort of a leading liberal figure to explain both to his correspondent and to himself what was at stake in these conflicts, and to explain the struggle through reference to a common Latin American past and hoped-for future. Shortly after writing the letter, he returned to Caracas and gradually assumed leadership of the rebel cause.

Born into an aristocratic family in Caracas, Bolívar was simultaneously privileged and disadvantaged, a person of wealth and status and a second-class citizen next to the *peninsulares*. For these and other reasons Bolívar was drawn to both liberalism and to intellectual currents that envisioned Latin Americans as distinct from their Spanish rulers. He and his

counterparts were Americans. Unsurprisingly then, Bolívar played an active part in the conspiracies that followed the Napoleonic invasion of Spain, leading several campaigns in Venezuela and Colombia, and establishing himself as an important intellectual author of independence through public speeches and his writings (see, for example, his *Manifiesto of Cartagena*, in 1813, and his *Address to the Congress of Angostura*, in 1819, both on the book's website at [www.routledge.com/textbooks/dawson](http://www.routledge.com/textbooks/dawson)).

Over time he refined his vision, which was always a complex combination of liberal republicanism and authoritarian values. Bolívar opposed slavery and proposed the distribution of land to those who fought for independence, but also favored heavy restrictions on suffrage and believed in a strong, almost dictatorial presidency. He attempted to fulfill this vision with the creation of Gran Colombia (modern Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, and Ecuador), over which he became president in September 1821. However, the country would dissolve even before his death in 1830, and Bolívar himself would die in disgrace, either the victim of his own ambitions or his follower's failures, depending on who told the tale. Whether or not these contradictions are tied to his enduring appeal, it is clear that his vision of a strong and united Latin America—an effective bulwark against an ascendant United States and imperial Europe—has always had the power to inspire political leaders in the region.

*Our America*, Document 1.2, is one of the most famous essays ever penned by a Latin American intellectual. Writing in 1891, three quarters of a century after the *Letter from Jamaica*, Martí confronts both the rise of the United States as the new imperial threat to Latin American sovereignty, and the fact that his own country (Cuba) remained a European colony. The essay introduces us to a particular tradition of Latin American essay writing in which the political and the poetic combine in a powerful mix to call readers to action. In part a contemplative piece of philosophy, and in part a direct call to political action, the essay argues both for Cuban independence and for a larger project of Latin American unity. In this sense, his essay is both about the crisis of a nation as yet chained to its colonial overlords and about the problem of forging a strong, united, and independent Latin America.

The final document in this chapter (1.3) is a speech delivered in 2004 by Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez (1954–2013). The speech invokes both Bolívar and the Chilean poet Pablo Neruda from the perspective of the early ~~twentieth~~ century in ways that remind readers that while a great deal has in fact changed in two centuries (Chávez was, after all, the president of one of the wealthier countries in the region, capable of forging alliances with political leaders around the world, a spokesman for the “global south,” all of which offered a stark contrast to Martí and Bolívar, who both penned their tracts from exile), many of the basic, even visceral desires of Bolívar's original letter continued to resonate.

Elected president of Venezuela in 1998, Chávez actively laid claim to Bolívar's legacy, calling his movement a Bolivarian revolution. He renamed his country the *Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela*, and built an enormous 17-story mausoleum in Caracas to house the mortal remains of the Great Liberator (see Figure 1.1). His vision of the dream called for radical internal reforms (an egalitarian social project that distributes wealth to the poor) and an expansive geo-political project that would unite Latin America through military and economic alliances such as the *Alternativa Bolivariana para América Latina y El Caribe* (Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and the Caribbean—ALBA). The project was complex, fueled by a mix of anti-imperial and socialist sentiments, along with a healthy dose of petro-dollar assistance from Venezuela. His political style, characterized by long, often rambling,



**Figure 1.1** The Simon Bolívar Mausoleum in Caracas

Source: Reuters/Carlos Garcia Rawlins

speeches, crude references to foreign heads of state, and mesmerizing political theater, made him a singular figure during the first decade of the twenty-first century.

At the time of his death in 2013, Chávez was one of the most polarizing figures in Latin America. His enemies accused him of limiting press freedoms, of using the power of the state illegitimately against his rivals, of acting like an autocrat, and of failing to resolve Venezuela's deep social and economic problems. To his supporters however, he offered the hope of a better future through his twentieth-century version of socialism, which promised to redistribute Venezuela's natural wealth to those who deserved and needed it most. More broadly, he offered to restore Latin American sovereignty, to combat the power of imperial hegemony like the United States.

Many of Chávez's enemies celebrated his passing at an early age, dead of cancer at the age of 58. Chávez's re-election to the Venezuelan presidency in the fall of 2012 had been more narrow than his allies had hoped, and his chosen successor, Nicolas Maduro, won election by only a 2 percent margin amid accusations of voter fraud. The thinness of the victory reminds us that Venezuela is a deeply divided society, where a certain iteration of the Bolivarian dream persists in spite of food and electricity shortages, inflation and other problems, and where opponents of that vision remain vocal, angry, and unbowed. These divisions also speak to the fact that the original promise of strength, unity, and prosperity uttered by Bolívar remains unfulfilled for tens of millions of Venezuelans. For similar reasons, the Bolivarian dream continues to resonate across Latin America as an optimistic alternative to a dystopian present.

## 22 Independence Narratives, Past and Present

Whether viewed through Bolívar, Martí, Chávez, or others (e.g., Calle 13's "Latinoamérica"<sup>5</sup>), the Bolivarian vision uses a story about the past, about how the nations define themselves, to call for a future that does justice to that past. One might suppose that in the face of so many discordant nationalisms—tensions between Argentines and Brazilians, El Salvadorans and Hondurans, Venezuelans and Colombians—the effort to invoke that common past and the fact that it has been done again and again over the course of two centuries is in itself worth noting. What the documents ask us to do however, is to look deeper, to ask what sorts of histories are privileged, what sorts of implications they have for the present and future, and perhaps most importantly, whose version of the past is privileged and whose is silenced?

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**Document 1.1 Simón Bolívar, the *Letter from Jamaica*: Kingston, Jamaica, September 6, 1815**

Source: *Selected Writings of Bolívar*, translated by Lewis Bertrand. New York: The Colonial Press, 1951.

My Dear Sir:

With what a feeling of gratitude I read that passage in your letter in which you say to me: "I hope that the success which then followed Spanish arms may now turn in favor of their adversaries, the badly oppressed people of South America." I take this hope as a prediction, if it is justice that determines man's contests. Success will crown our efforts, because the destiny of America has been irrevocably decided; the tie that bound her to Spain has been severed. Only a concept maintained that tie and kept the parts of that immense monarchy together. That which formerly bound them now divides them. The hatred that the Peninsula has inspired in us is greater than the ocean between us. It would be easier to have the two continents meet than to reconcile the spirits of the two countries. The habit of obedience; a community of interest, of understanding, of religion; mutual goodwill; a tender regard for the birthplace and good name of our forefathers; in short, all that gave rise to our hopes, came to us from Spain. As a result there was born [the] principle of affinity that seemed eternal, notwithstanding the misbehavior of our rulers which weakened that sympathy, or, rather, that bond enforced by the domination of their rule. At present the contrary attitude persists: we are threatened with the fear of death, dishonor, and every harm; there is nothing we have not suffered at the hands of that unnatural stepmother—Spain. The veil has been torn asunder. We have already seen the light, and it is not our desire to be thrust back into darkness . . .

The role of the inhabitants of the American hemisphere has for centuries been purely passive. Politically they were nonexistent. We are still in a position lower than slavery, and therefore it is more difficult for us to rise to the enjoyment of freedom . . . States are slaves because of either the nature or the misuse of their constitutions; a people is therefore enslaved when the government, by its nature or its vices, infringes on and usurps the rights of the citizen or subject. Applying these principles, we find

that America was denied not only its freedom but even an active and effective tyranny. Let me explain. Under absolutism there are no recognized limits to the exercise of governmental powers. The will of the great sultan, khan, bey, and other despotic rulers is the supreme law, carried out more or less arbitrarily by the lesser pashas, khans, and satraps of Turkey and Persia, who have an organized system of oppression in which inferiors participate according to the authority vested in them. To them is entrusted the administration of civil, military, political, religious, and tax matters. But, after all is said and done, the rulers of Isfahan are Persians; the viziers of the Grand Turk are Turks; and the sultans of Tartary are Tartars.

How different is our situation! We have been harassed by a conduct which has not only deprived us of our rights but has kept us in a sort of permanent infancy with regard to public affairs. If we could at least have managed our domestic affairs and our internal administration, we could have acquainted ourselves with the processes and mechanics of public affairs. We should also have enjoyed a personal consideration, thereby commanding a certain unconscious respect from the people, which is so necessary to preserve amidst revolutions. That is why I say we have even been deprived of an active tyranny, since we have not been permitted to exercise its functions.

Americans today, and perhaps to a greater extent than ever before, who live within the Spanish system occupy a position in society no better than that of serfs destined for labor, or at best they have no more status than that of mere consumers. Yet even this status is surrounded with galling restrictions, such as being forbidden to grow European crops, or to store products which are royal monopolies, or to establish factories of a type the Peninsula itself does not possess. To this add the exclusive trading privileges, even in articles of prime necessity, and the barriers between American provinces, designed to prevent all exchange of trade, traffic, and understanding. In short, do you wish to know what our future held?—simply the cultivation of the fields of indigo, grain, coffee, sugar cane, cacao, and cotton; cattle raising on the broad plains; hunting wild game in the jungles; digging in the earth to mine its gold—but even these limitations could never satisfy the greed of Spain.

So negative was our existence that I can find nothing comparable in any other civilized society, examine as I may the entire history of time and the politics of all nations. Is it not an outrage and a violation of human rights to expect a land so splendidly endowed, so vast, rich, and populous, to remain merely passive?

As I have just explained, we were cut off and, as it were, removed from the world in relation to the science of government and administration of the state. We were never viceroys or governors, save in the rarest of instances; seldom archbishops and bishops; diplomats never; as military men, only subordinates; as nobles, without royal privileges. In brief, we were neither magistrates nor financiers and seldom merchants—all in flagrant contradiction to our institutions.

It is harder, Montesquieu has written, to release a nation from servitude than to enslave a free nation. This truth is proven by the annals of all times, which reveal that most free nations have been put under the yoke, but very few enslaved nations have recovered their liberty. Despite the convictions of history, South Americans have made efforts to obtain liberal, even perfect, institutions, doubtless out of that instinct to aspire to the greatest possible happiness, which, common to all men, is bound to

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follow in civil societies founded on the principles of justice, liberty, and equality. But are we capable of maintaining in proper balance the difficult charge of a republic? Is it conceivable that a newly emancipated people can soar to the heights of liberty, and, unlike Icarus, neither have its wings melt nor fall into an abyss? Such a marvel is inconceivable and without precedent. There is no reasonable probability to bolster our hopes.

More than anyone, I desire to see America fashioned into the greatest nation in the world, greatest not so much by virtue of her area and wealth as by her freedom and glory. Although I seek perfection for the government of my country, I cannot persuade myself that the New World can, at the moment, be organized as a great republic. Since it is impossible, I dare not desire it; yet much less do I desire to have all America a monarchy because this plan is not only impracticable but also impossible. Wrongs now existing could not be righted, and our emancipation would be fruitless. The American states need the care of paternal governments to heal the sores and wounds of despotism and war . . .

From the foregoing, we can draw these conclusions: The American provinces are fighting for their freedom, and they will ultimately succeed. Some provinces as a matter of course will form federal and some central republics; the larger areas will inevitably establish monarchies, some of which will fare so badly that they will disintegrate in either present or future revolutions. To consolidate a great monarchy will be no easy task, but it will be utterly impossible to consolidate a great republic.

When success is not assured, when the state is weak, and when results are distantly seen, all men hesitate; opinion is divided, passions rage, and the enemy fans these passions in order to win an easy victory because of them. As soon as we are strong and under the guidance of a liberal nation which will lend us her protection, we will achieve accord in cultivating the virtues and talents that lead to glory. Then will we march majestically toward that great prosperity for which South America is destined.

I am, Sir, etc., etc.

Simón Bolívar

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**Document 1.2 José Martí, "Our America," from *La Revista Ilustrada*, New York, January 1, 1891**

Source: "Our America" from *The America of José Martí*, translated by Juan de Onís. Translation copyright © 1954, renewed 1982 by Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, Inc.

The prideful villager thinks his hometown contains the whole world, and as long as he can stay on as mayor or humiliate the rival who stole his sweetheart or watch his nest egg accumulating in its strongbox he believes the universe to be in good order, unaware of the giants in seven-league boots who can crush him underfoot or the battling comets in the heavens that go through the air devouring the sleeping worlds. Whatever is left of that sleepy hometown in America must awaken. These are not times

for going to bed in a sleeping cap, but rather, like Juan de Castellanos' men, with our weapons for a pillow, weapons of the mind, which vanquish all others. Trenches of ideas are worth more than trenches of stone.

A cloud of ideas is a thing no armored prow can smash though. A vital idea set ablaze before the world at the right moment can, like the mystic banner of the last judgment, stop a fleet of battleships. Hometowns that are still strangers to one another must hurry to become acquainted, like men who are about to do battle together. Those who shake their fists at each other like jealous brothers quarreling over a piece of land or the owner of a small house who envies the man with a better one must join hands and interlace them until their two hands are as one. Those who, shielded by a criminal tradition, mutilate, with swords smeared in the same blood that flows through their own veins, the land of a conquered brother whose punishment far exceeds his crimes, must return that land to their brother if they do not wish to be known as a nation of plunderers. The honorable man does not collect his debts of honor in money, at so much per slap. We can no longer be a nation of fluttering leaves, spending our lives in the air, our treetop crowned in flowers, humming or creaking, caressed by the caprices of sunlight or thrashed and felled by tempests. The trees must form ranks to block the seven-league giant! It is the hour of reckoning and of marching in unison, and we must move in lines as compact as the veins of silver that lie at the roots of the Andes.

Only runts whose growth was stunted will lack the necessary valor, for those who have no faith in their land are like men born prematurely. Having no valor themselves, they deny that other men do. Their puny arms, with bracelets and painted nails, the arms of Madrid or of Paris, cannot manage the lofty tree and so they say the tree cannot be climbed. We must load up the ships with these termites who gnaw away at the core of the patria that has nurtured them; if they are Parisians or Madrileños then let them stroll to the Prado by lamplight or go to Tortoni's for an ice. These sons of carpenters who are ashamed that their father was a carpenter! These men born in America who are ashamed of the mother that raised them because she wears an Indian apron, these delinquents who disown their sick mother and leave her alone in her sickbed! Which one is truly a man, he who stays with his mother to nurse her through her illness, or he who forces her to work somewhere out of sight, and lives off her sustenance in corrupted lands, with a worm for his insignia, cursing the bosom that bore him, sporting a sign that says "traitor" on the back of his paper dress-coat? These sons of our America, which must save herself through her Indians, and which is going from less to more, who desert her and take up arms in the armies of North America, which drowns its own Indians in blood and going from more to less! These delicate creatures who are men but do not want to do men's work! Did Washington, who made that land for them, go and live with the English during the years when he saw the English marching against his own land? These *incroyables* who drag their honor across foreign soil, like the *incroyables* of the French Revolution, dancing, smacking their lips, and deliberately slurring their words!

And in what patria can a man take greater pride than in our long-suffering republics of America, erected among mute masses of Indians upon the bloodied arms of no more than a hundred apostles, to the sound of the book doing battle against the

monk's tall candle? Never before have such advanced and consolidated nations been created from such disparate factors in less historical time. The haughty man thinks that because he wields a quick pen or a vivid phrase the earth was made to be his pedestal, and accuses his nature republic or irredeemable incompetence because its virgin jungles do not continually provide him with the means of going about the world a famous plutocrat, driving Persian ponies and spilling champagne. The incapacity lies not in the emerging country, which demands forms that are appropriate to it and a grandeur that is useful, but in the leaders who try to rule unique nations of a singular and violent composition, with laws inherited from four centuries of free practice in the United States and nineteen centuries of monarchy in France. A gaucho's pony cannot be stopped in mid-bolt by one of Alexander Hamilton's laws. The sluggish blood of the Indian race cannot be quickened by a phrase from Sieyès. To govern well, one must attend closely to the reality of the place that is governed. In America, the good ruler does not need to know how the German or Frenchman is governed, but what elements his own country is composed of and how he can marshal them so as to reach, by means and institutions born from the country itself, the desirable state in which every man knows himself and is active, and all men enjoy the abundance that Nature, for the good of all, has bestowed on the country they make fruitful by their labor and defend with their lives. The government must be born from the country. The spirit of the government must be the spirit of the country. The form of the government must be in harmony with the country's natural constitution. The government is no more than an equilibrium among the country's natural elements.

In America the natural man has triumphed over the imported book. Natural men have triumphed over an artificial intelligentsia. The native mestizo has triumphed over the alien, pure-blooded *criollo*. The battle is not between civilization and barbarity, but between false erudition and nature. The natural man is good, and esteems and rewards a superior intelligence as long as that intelligence does not use his submission against him or offend him by ignoring him—for that the natural man deems unforgivable, and he is prepared to use force to regain the respect of anyone who wounds his sensibilities or harms his interests. The tyrants of America have come to power by acquiescing to these scorned natural elements and have fallen as soon as they betrayed them. The republics have purged the former tyrannies of their inability to know the true elements of the country, derive the form of government from them, and govern along with them. Governor, in a new country, means Creator.

In countries composed of educated and uneducated sectors, the uneducated will govern by their habit of attacking and resolving their doubts with their fists, unless the educated learn the art of governing. The uneducated masses are lazy and timid about matters of the intellect and want to be well-governed, but if the government injures them they shake it off and govern themselves. How can our governors emerge from the universities when there is not a university in America that teaches the most basic element of the art of governing, which is the analysis of all that is unique to the peoples of America? Our youth go out into the world wearing Yankee- or French-colored glasses and aspire to rule by guesswork a country they do not know. Those unacquainted with the rudiments of politics should not be allowed to embark on a career in politics. The literary prizes must not go to the best ode, but to the best study of the

political factors in the student's country. In the newspapers, lecture halls, and academies, the study of the country's real factors must be carried forward. Simply knowing those factors without blindfolds or circumlocutions is enough—for anyone who deliberately or unknowingly sets aside a part of the truth will ultimately fail because of the truth he was lacking, which expands when neglected and brings down whatever is built without it. Solving the problem after knowing its elements is easier than solving it without knowing them. The natural man, strong and indignant, comes and overthrows the authority that is accumulated from books because it is not administered in keeping with the manifest needs of the country. To know is to solve. To know the country and govern it in accordance with that knowledge is the only way of freeing it from tyranny. The European university must yield to the American university. The history of America from the Incas to the present must be taught in its smallest detail, even if the Greek Archons go untaught. Our own Greece is preferable to the Greece that is not ours; we need it more. Statesmen who arise from the nation must replace statesmen who are alien to it. Let the world be grafted onto our republics, but we must be the trunk. And let the vanquished pedant hold his tongue, for there is no patria in which a man can take greater pride than in our long-suffering American republics.

Our feet upon a rosary, our heads white, and our bodies a motley of Indian and *criollo* we boldly entered the community of nations. Bearing the standard of the Virgin, we went out to conquer our liberty. A priest, a few lieutenants, and a woman built a republic in Mexico upon the shoulders of the Indians. A Spanish cleric, under cover of his priestly cape, taught French liberty to a handful of magnificent students who chose a Spanish general to lead central America against Spain. Still accustomed to monarchy, and with the sun on their chests, the Venezuelans in the north and the Argentines in the south set out to construct nations. When the two heroes clashed and their continent was about to be rocked, one of them, and not the lesser one, turned back. But heroism is less glorious in peacetime than in war, and thus rarer, and it is easier for a man to die with honor than to think in an orderly way. Exalted and unanimous sentiments are more readily governed than the diverging, arrogant, alien, and ambitious ideas that emerge when the battle is over. The powers that were swept up in the epic struggle, along with the feline wariness of the species and the sheer weight of reality, undermined the edifice that had raised the flags of nations sustained by wise governance in the continual practice of reason and freedom over the crude and singular regions of our mestizo America with its towns of bare legs and Parisian dress-coats. The colonial hierarchy resisted the republic's democracy, and the capital city, wearing its elegant cravat, left the countryside, in its horsehide boots, waiting at the door; the redeemers born from books did not understand that a revolution that had triumphed when the soul of the earth was unleashed by a savior's voice had to govern with the soul of the earth and not against or without it. And for all these reasons, America began enduring and still endures the weary task of reconciling the discordant and hostile elements it inherited from its perverse, despotic colonizer with the imported forms and ideas that have, in their lack of local reality, delayed the advent of a logical form of government. The continent, deformed by three centuries of a rule that denied man the right to exercise his reason, embarked—overlooking or refusing to listen to the ignorant masses that had helped it redeem itself—upon a government based on reason, the reason of

all directed toward the things that are of concern to all, and not the university-taught reason of the few imposed upon the rustic reason of others. The problem of independence was not the change in form, but the change in spirit.

Common cause had to be made with the oppressed in order to consolidate a system that was opposed to the interests and governmental habits of the oppressors. The tiger, frightened away by the flash of gunfire, creeps back in the night to find his prey. He will die with flames shooting from his eyes, his claws unsheathed, but now his step is inaudible for he comes on velvet paws. When the prey awakens, the tiger is upon him. The colony lives on in the republic, but our America is saving itself from its grave blunders—the arrogance of the capital cities, the blind triumph of the scorned campesinos, the excessive importation of foreign ideas and formulas, the wicked and impolitic disdain for the native race—through the superior virtue, confirmed by necessary bloodshed, of the republic that struggles against the colony. The tiger waits behind every tree, crouches in every corner. He will die, his claws unsheathed, flames shooting from his eyes.

But “these countries will be saved,” in the words of the Argentine Rivadavia, who erred on the side of urbanity during crude times; the machete is ill-suited to a silken scabbard, nor can the spear be abandoned in a country won by the spear, for it becomes enraged and stands in the doorway of Iturbide’s Congress demanding that “the fair-skinned man be made emperor.” These countries will be saved because, with the genius of moderation that now seems, by nature’s serene harmony, to prevail in the continent of light, and the influence of the critical reading that has, in Europe, replaced the fumbling ideas about phalansteries in which the previous generation was steeped, the real man is being born to America, in these real times.

What a vision we were: the chest of an athlete, the hands of a dandy, and the forehead of a child. We were a whole fancy dress ball, in English trousers, a Parisian waistcoat, a North American overcoat, and a Spanish bullfighter’s hat. The Indian circled about us, mute, and went to the mountaintop to christen his children. The black, pursued from afar, alone and unknown, sang his heart’s music in the night, between waves and wild beasts. The campesinos, the men of the land, the creators, rose up in blind indignation against the disdainful city, their own creation. We wore epaulets and judge’s robes, in countries that came into the world wearing rope sandals and Indian headbands. The wise thing would have been to pair, with charitable hearts and the audacity of our founders, the Indian headband and the judicial robe, to undam the Indian, make a place for the able black, and tailor liberty to the bodies of those who rose up and triumphed in its name. What we had was the judge, the general, the man of letters, and the cleric. Our angelic youth, as if struggling from the arms of an octopus, cast their heads into the heavens and fell back with sterile glory, crowned with clouds. The natural people, driven by instinct, blind with triumph, overwhelmed their gilded rulers. No Yankee or European book could furnish the key to the Hispanoamerican enigma. So the people tried hatred instead, and our countries amounted to less and less each year. Weary of useless hatred, of the struggle of book against sword, reason against the monk’s taper, city against countryside, the impossible empire of the quarreling urban castes against the tempestuous or inert natural nation, we are beginning, almost unknowingly, to try love. The nations arise and salute one another.

"What are we like?" they ask, and begin telling each other what they are like. When a problem arises in Cojimar they no longer seek the solution in Danzig. The frock-coats are still French, but the thinking begins to be American. The young men of America are rolling up their sleeves and plunging their hands into the dough, and making it rise with the leavening of their sweat. They understand that there is too much imitation, and that salvation lies in creating. Create is this generation's password. Make wine from plantains; it may be sour, but it is our wine! It is now understood that a country's form of government must adapt to its natural elements, that absolute ideas, in order not to collapse over an error of form, must be expressed in relative forms; that liberty, in order to be viable, must be sincere and full, that if the republic does not open its arms to all and include all in its progress, it dies. The tiger inside came in through the gap, and so will the tiger outside. The general holds the cavalry's speed to the pace of the infantry, for if he leaves the infantry far behind, the enemy will surround the cavalry. Politics is strategy. Nations must continually criticize themselves, for criticism is health, but with a single heart and a single mind. Lower yourselves to the unfortunate and raise them up in your arms! Let the heart's fires unfreeze all that is motionless in America, and let the country's natural blood surge and throb through its veins! Standing tall, the workmen's eyes full of joy, the new men of America are saluting each other from one country to another. Natural statesmen are emerging from the direct study of nature; they read in order to apply what they read, not copy it. Economists are studying problems at their origins. Orators are becoming more temperate. Dramatists are putting native characters onstage. Academies are discussing practical subjects. Poetry is snipping off its wild, Zorilla-esque mane and hanging up its gaudy waistcoat on the glorious tree. Prose, polished and gleaming, is replete with ideas. The rulers of Indian republics are learning Indian languages.

America is saving herself from all her dangers. Over some republics the octopus sleeps still, but by the law of equilibrium, other republics are running into the sea to recover the lost centuries with mad and sublime swiftness. Others, forgetting that Juárez traveled in a coach drawn by mules, hitch their coach to the wind and take a soap bubble for coachman—and poisonous luxury, enemy of liberty, corrupts the frivolous and opens the door to foreigners. The virile character of others is being perfected by the epic spirit of a threatened independence. And others, in rapacious wars against their neighbors, are nurturing an unruly soldier caste that may devour them. But our America may also face another danger, which comes not from within but from the differing origins, methods, and interests of the continent's two factions. The hour is near when she will be approached by an enterprising and forceful nation that will demand intimate relations with her, though it does not know her and disdains her. And virile nations self-made by the rifle and the law love other virile nations, and love only them. The hour of unbridled passion and ambition from which North America may escape by the ascendancy of the purest element in its blood—or into which its vengeful and sordid masses, its tradition of conquest, and the self-interest of a cunning leader could plunge it—is not yet so close, even to the most apprehensive eye, that there is no time for it to be confronted and averted by the manifestation of a discreet and unswerving pride, for its dignity as a republic, in the eyes of the watchful nations of the Universe, places upon North America a brake that our America must not remove by

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puerile provocation, ostentatious arrogance, or patricidal discord. Therefore the urgent duty of our America is to show herself as she is, one in soul and intent, rapidly overcoming the crushing weight of her past and stained only by the fertile blood shed by hands that do battle against ruins and by veins that were punctured by our former masters. The disdain of the formidable neighbor who does not know her is our America's greatest danger, and it is urgent—for the day of the visit is near—that her neighbor come to know her, and quickly, so that he will not disdain her. Out of ignorance, he may perhaps begin to covet her. But when he knows her, he will remove his hands from her in respect. One must have faith in the best in man and distrust the worst. One must give the best every opportunity, so that the worst will be laid bare and overcome. If not, the worst will prevail. Nations should have one special pillory for those who incite them to futile hatreds, and another for those who do not tell them the truth until it is too late.

There is no racial hatred, because there are no races. Sickly, lamp-lit minds string together and rewarm the library-shelf races that the honest traveler and the cordial observer seek in vain in the justice of nature, where the universal identity of man leaps forth in victorious love and turbulent appetite. The soul, equal and eternal, emanates from bodies that are diverse in form and color. Anyone who promotes and disseminates opposition or hatred among races is committing a sin against humanity. But within that jumble of peoples which lives in close proximity to our peoples, certain peculiar and dynamic characteristics are condensed—ideas and habits of expansion, acquisition, vanity, and greed—that could, in a period of internal disorder or precipitation of a people's cumulative character, cease to be latent national preoccupations and become a serious threat to the neighboring, isolated and weak lands that the strong country declares to be perishable and inferior. To think is to serve. We must not, out of a villager's antipathy, impute some lethal congenital wickedness to the continent's light-skinned nation simply because it does not speak our language or share our view of what home life should be or resemble us in its political failings, which are different from ours, or because it does not think highly of quick-tempered, swarthy men or look with charity, from its still uncertain eminence, upon those less favored by history who, in heroic stages, are climbing the road that republics travel. But neither should we seek to conceal the obvious facts of the problem, which can, for the peace of the centuries, be resolved by timely study and the urgent, wordless union of the continental soul. For the unanimous hymn is already ringing forth, and the present generation is bearing industrious America along the road sanctioned by our sublime forefathers. From the Rio Bravo to the Straits of Magellan, the Great Cemi, seated on a condor's back, has scattered the seeds of the new America across the romantic nations of the continent and the suffering islands of the sea!

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**Document 1.3 Speech by President Hugo Chávez at the opening of XII G-15 Summit, Monday, March 1, 2004**

. . . Ladies and Gentlemen.

Welcome to this land washed by the waters of the Atlantic Ocean and the Caribbean Sea, crossed by the magnificent Orinoco River. A land crowned by the perpetual snow of the Andean mountains . . .!

A land overwhelmed by the never-ending magic of the Amazon forest and its mil-lenary chants . . .!

Welcome to Venezuela, the land where a patriotic people has again taken over the banners of Simón Bolívar, its Liberator, whose name is well known beyond these frontiers!

As Pablo Neruda said in his "Chant to Bolívar": **Our** Father thou art in Heaven,  
in water, in air  
in all our silent and broad latitude  
everything bears your name, Father in our dwelling:  
your name raises sweetness in sugar cane  
Bolívar tin has a Bolívar gleam  
the Bolívar bird flies over the Bolívar volcano the potato, the saltpeter, the special  
shadows, the brooks, the phosphorous stone veins everything comes from your  
extinguished life your legacy was rivers, plains, bell towers  
your legacy is our daily bread, oh Father.

Yes, ladies and gentlemen: Bolívar, another "Quixote but not mad" (as Napoleon Bonaparte had already called Francisco de Miranda, the universal man from Caracas), who on this very same South American soil tried to unite the emerging republics into a single, strong and free republic.

In his letter from Jamaica in 1815, Bolívar spoke of convening an Amphictyonic Congress in the Isthmus of Panama:

"I wish one day we would have the opportunity to install there an august congress with the representatives of the Republics, Kingdoms and Empires to debate and discuss the highest interests of Peace and War with the countries of the other three parts of the world."

Bolívar reveals himself as an anti-imperialist leader, sharing the same ideals that materialized in the Bandung Conference in April 1955, 140 years after that insightful letter from Kingston. Inspired by Nehru, Tito, and Nasser, a group of important leaders gathered at this conference to confront their great challenges, and expressed their desire to not be involved in the East-West Conflict, but rather to work together toward national development. This was the first key milestone: It was the first Afro-Asian conference, the immediate precedent of the Non-Aligned Countries, which gathered 29 Heads of State and gave birth to the "Conscience of the South."

Two events of great political significance occurred in the 60s: the creation of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in 1961 and the Group of the 77 in 1964: Two milestones and a clear historic trend: the need of the South to be self-aware and to act in concert in a world characterized by imbalance and unequal exchange.

In the 70s a proposal from the IV Summit of Heads of State of the Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers in 1973 becomes important: the need to create a new international economic order. In 1974 the UN Assembly ratified this proposal, and while it remains in effect to this day, it has ended up becoming a mere historical footnote.

Two events that were very important for the struggles in the South occurred during the 80s: the creation of the Commission of the South in Kuala Lumpur in 1987 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere, the unforgettable fighter of Tanzania and the world.

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Two years later, in September 1989, the Group of the 15 is created out of a meeting of the Non-Aligned Countries, with the purpose of strengthening South-South cooperation.

In 1990, the South-Commission submitted its strategic proposal: "A Challenge for the South." And later on . . . later on came the flood that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the Soviet Union. As Joseph Stiglitz said, this brought unipolarity and the arrival of the "happy 90s."

All those struggles, ideas and proposals sank in the neo-liberal flood. The world experienced the so-called end of History, accompanied by the triumphant chant of (those who advocated) neo-liberal globalization, which today, besides being an objective reality, is a weapon they use to manipulate us into passivity in the face of an economic world order that excludes our countries of the South and condemns us to perpetually play the role of producers of wealth and recipients of leftovers.

Never before had the world such tremendous scientific-technical potential, such a capacity to generate wealth and well-being. Authentic technological wonders that have eliminated the distances between places. Still, (these innovations) have helped only a very few people, the 15 percent of the global population that lives in the countries of the North.

Globalization has not brought so-called interdependence, but an increase in dependency. Instead of wealth being globalized, it is poverty that is increasingly widespread. We have not seen general or shared development. Instead, the abyss between the North and South is so enormous that it is obviously unsustainable—those who try and justify their opulence and waste are simply blind.

The faces of the neo-liberal world economic order are not only the Internet, virtual reality, or the exploration of outer-space, but they can also be seen—and more dramatically—in the countries of the South, where 790 million people are starving, where 800 million adults are illiterate, and where 654 million human beings alive today will not grow older than 40 years of age. This is the harsh and hard face of a world economic order dominated by neo-liberalism, and it is seen every year in the South, where every year 11 million boys and girls below 5 years of age die as a result of illnesses that are practically always preventable and curable. They die at the appalling rate of over 30 thousand every day, 21 every minute, 10 each 30 seconds. In the South, the proportion of children suffering from malnutrition reaches 50 percent in quite a few countries, while according to the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations), a child who lives in the First World will consume the equivalent of what 50 children consume in an underdeveloped country during his or her life time.

The great hope that a globalization based in solidarity and true cooperation would bring scientific-technical wonders to all people in the world has been reduced to this grotesque caricature, full of exploitation and social injustice, by the Neo-liberal model.

Our countries of the South were told a thousand times that the only and true "science" capable of ensuring development and well-being for everybody dictated that we let the markets operate without regulation, privatize everything, create the conditions for transnational capital investment, and ban the State from intervening in the economy.

Almost the magical and wonderful philosopher's stone!!

Neo-liberal thought and politics were created in the North to serve their interests, but it should be highlighted that they have never been truly applied there. They have instead been spread throughout the South in the past two decades and have now come to be become the only acceptable way of thinking, with disastrous results.

As a result of the application of (neo-liberal) thinking, the world economy as a whole has grown less than in the three decades between 1945 and 1975, when the Keynesian theories, which promoted market regulation through State intervention, were applied. The gap separating the North and the South continued to grow, not only in terms of economic indicators, but also with regards to access to knowledge, the strategic sector that creates the fundamental possibility of integral development in our times.

With only 15 percent of the world population, the countries of the North count over 85 percent of Internet users and control 97 percent of the patents. These countries have an average of over 10 years of schooling, while in the countries of the South schooling barely reaches 3.7 years and in many countries it is even lower. The tragedy of under-development and poverty in Africa, with its historic roots in colonialism and the enslavement of millions of its children, is now reinforced by neo-liberalism imposed from the North. In this region, the rate of infant mortality in children under 1 year of age is 107 per each thousand children born alive, while in developed countries this rate is 6 per each thousand children born alive. Also, life expectancy is 48 years, 30 years less than in the countries of the North.

In Asia, economic growth in some countries has been remarkable, but the region as a whole is still lagging behind the North in basic economic and social development indicators.

We are, dear friends, in Latin America, the favorite testing-ground of the neo-liberal model in the recent decades. Here, neo-liberalism reached the status of a dogma and was applied with greatest severity. Its catastrophic results can be easily seen, and explain the growing and uncontrollable social protests unleashed by the poor and excluded people of Latin America for some years now, and which every day grow stronger. They claim their right to life, to education, to health, to culture, to a decent living as human beings.

Dear friends:

I witnessed this with my own eyes, on a day like today but exactly 15 years ago, the 27th of February 1989, an intense day of protest that erupted on the streets of Caracas against the neo-liberal reforms of the International Monetary Fund and ended in a very real massacre known as "The Caracazo."

The neoliberal model promised Latin Americans greater economic growth, but during the neo-liberal years growth has not even reached half the rate achieved in the 1945–1975 period under different policies.

The model recommended the most strict financial and trade liberalization in order to achieve a greater influx of foreign capital and greater stability. But during the neo-liberal years the financial crises have been more intense and frequent than ever before. The external regional debt was non-existent at the end of the Second World War, and today amounts to 750 billion dollars, the per capita highest debt in the world and in several countries equal to more than half the GDP. Between 1990 and the year 2002 alone, Latin America made external debt payments amounting to 1 trillion 528 billion

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dollars, which is twice the amount of the current debt and represented an annual average payment of 118 billion. That is, we pay the debt every 6.3 years, but this evil burden continues to be there, unchanging and inextinguishable.

It is a never-ending debt!!

Obviously, this debt has exceeded the normal and reasonable payment commitments of any debtor and has turned into an instrument to undercapitalize our countries. It has additionally forced the imposition of socially adverse measures that in turn politically destabilize those governments that implement them. We were asked to be ultraliberal, to lift all trade barriers to imports coming from the North, but those oral champions of trade have in practice been champions of protectionism. The North spends 1 billion dollars per day practicing what it has banned us from doing, that is, subsidizing inefficient products. I want to tell you—and this is true and verifiable—that each cow grazing in the European Union receives in its four stomachs 2.20 dollars a day in subsidies, thus having a better situation than the 2.5 billion poor people in the South who barely survive on incomes of less than 2 dollars a day.

With the FTAA (Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), the government of the United States wants us to reduce our tariffs to zero for their benefit and wants us to give away our markets, our oil, our water resources and biodiversity, in addition to our sovereignty, whereas walls of subsidies for agriculture keep access closed to that country's market. It seems a peculiar way to reduce the huge commercial deficit of the United States; to do exactly the opposite of what they claims is a sacred principle in economic policy.

Neo-liberalism promised Latin Americans that if they accepted the demands of multinational capital, investments would flood the region. Indeed, the in-flow of capital increased. Some portion (came) to buy state-owned companies, sometimes at bargain prices, another portion was speculative capital that seized opportunities arising from financial liberalization.

The neo-liberal model promised that after the painful adjustment period, which was necessary to deprive the State of its regulatory power over the economy and liberalize trade and finance, wealth would spread across Latin America and the region's long history of poverty and underdevelopment would be left in the past. But the painful and temporary adjustment became permanent and appears to be becoming everlasting. The results cannot be concealed.

If we look at 1980, the year we conventionally denote as the start of the neo-liberal cycle, we see that at that time around 35 percent of Latin Americans were poor. Two decades later, 44 percent of Latin American men and women are poor. Poverty is particularly cruel to children. It is a sad reality that in Latin America most of the poor people are children and most children are poor. In the late 90s, the Economic Commission for Latin America reported that 58 percent of children under 5 were poor, along with 57 percent of children between 6 and 12. Poverty among children and teenagers tends to reinforce and perpetuate unequal access to education, as was shown by a 15 country survey conducted by the Inter-American Development Bank. Among households in the 10 percent of the population with the highest income average schooling was 11 years, whereas among households in the bottom 30 percent of income the average was 4 years.

Neo-liberalism promised wealth. And poverty has spread, thus making Latin America the most unequal region in the world in terms of income distribution. The wealthiest 10 percent of the population in the region—those who are satisfied with neo-liberalism and feel enthusiastic about the FTAA—receive nearly 50 percent of the total income, while the poorest 10 percent—those who never appear in the society pages of the oligarchic mass media—barely receive 1.5 percent of total income.

This model based on exploitation has turned Latin America and the Caribbean into a social time-bomb; ready to explode, should anti-development, unemployment and poverty keep increasing.

Even though the social struggles are growing sharp and even some governments have been overthrown in uprisings, we are told by the North that neo-liberal reforms have not yielded good results because they have not been implemented in full. So, they now intend to recommend a formula for suicide. But we know, brothers and sisters, that countries do not commit suicide. The people of our countries will awaken, stand up and fight!

As a conclusion, Your Excellencies, (I say that) because of its injustice and inequality, the economic and social order of neo-liberal globalization appears to be a dead-end street for the South.

Therefore, the Heads of State and governments who are responsible for the well-being of our peoples cannot passively accept the exclusionary rules imposed by this economic and social order.

The history of our countries tells us that without doubt, passivity and grieving are useless. Instead, the only conduct that will enable the South to raise itself from its miserable role as backwards, exploited, and humiliated is concerted and firm action.

Thanks to the heroic struggle against colonialism, the developing countries destroyed an economic and social order that condemned them to the status of exploited colonies. Colonialism was not defeated by the accumulation of tears of sorrow, or by the repentance of colonialists, but by centuries of heroic battles for independence and sovereignty in which the resistance, tenacity and sacrifices of our peoples worked wonders.

Here in South America, we commemorate this very year the 180th anniversary of the Battle of Ayacucho, where people united in a liberating army after almost 20 years of revolutionary wars under the inspired leadership of José de San Martín, Bernardo O'Higgins, José Inacio de Abreu e Lima, Simón Bolívar and Antonio José de Sucre, expelling a Spanish empire that had hitherto extended from the warm beaches of the Caribbean to the cold lands of Patagonia, and thus ending 300 years of colonialism.

Today, in the face of the obvious failure of neo-liberalism and the great threat that the international economic order represents for our countries, it is necessary to reclaim the Spirit of the South.

That is where this Summit in Caracas is heading.

I propose to re-launch the G-15 as a South Integration Movement rather than a group. A movement for the promotion of all possible trends, to work with the Non-aligned Movement, the Group of 77, China . . . The entire South!!

I propose that we reiterate the proposals of the 1990 South Commission:

Why not focus our attention and political actions to the proposal that we offer several thousand "Grants of the South" per year to students from under- developed

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countries so that they can continue their studies in the South; or (the proposal that we) dramatically increase our cooperation in health in order to decrease infant mortality, provide basic medical care, fight AIDS?

We must develop these and many other programs with solidarity in order to ease the deep suffering that characterizes the South, and confront the costly and ineffective results of our dependence on the North.

Why not create the Debtor's Fund as an elemental defense tool? It could have consultations and coordinate collective action policies to confront the ways creditor's forum protect their interests.

Why not transform our symbolic system of trade preferences among developing countries into something more advanced, that can counteract the protectionism of the North, which excludes our countries from their markets?

Why not promote trade and investment flows within the South instead of competing in a suicidal fashion to offer concessions to the multinationals of the North?

Why not establish the University of the South? Why not create the Bank of the South?

These and other proposals will retain their value. They await our political will to turn them into reality.

But finally, dear friends, I would like to mention a particular proposal, which, in my opinion, has great significance:

In the South we are victims of the media monopoly of the North, which acts as a power system that disseminates in our countries and plants in the minds of our citizens information, values and consumption patterns that are basically alien to our realities and that have become the most powerful and effective tools of domination. Never is domination more perfect than when the dominated people think like the dominators do.

To face and begin to change this reality, I dare to propose the creation of a TV channel that could be seen throughout the world, showing information and pictures from the South. This would be the first and fundamental step in crushing the media monopoly.

In a very short time this TV channel of the South could broadcast our values and our roots throughout the world. It could tell the people in the world, in the words of the great poet Mario Benedetti, a man from the deep South, Uruguay, where the La Plata River opens so much that it looks like a silver sea, and washes my dear Buenos Aires and bluish Montevideo:

"The South Also Exists"

With its French horn

and its Swedish academy its American sauce

and its English wrenches with all its missiles

and its encyclopedias its star wars

and its opulent viciousness with all its laurels

the North commands,

but down here, down close to the roots

is where memory no memory omits and there are those who defy death for

and die for

and thus together achieve what was impossible  
 that the whole world would know  
 that the South,  
 that the South also exists

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much

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## At A Glance: Political Divisions

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
- A.1) Map: Colonial Latin America
- A.2) Map: Mid-nineteenth-century Latin America
- A.3) Map: Mexico's Loss of Territory
- A.4) Map: Contemporary Latin America

Latin America's political boundaries were transformed at independence. A system of Vice-Royalties (~~four principle Spanish colonies: New Spain, Peru, La Plata, and New Grenada, and Portugal's Brazilian Colony~~) along with several Captaincies General, became sovereign nations (**Figure A.1**). While in the United States thirteen colonies yielded one federally organized state, the Spanish colonies fragmented into a multitude of countries between 1810 and 1850. In the Caribbean, the changes were even more complex. Some colonies won independence, while others remained within a variety of European imperial systems (some remain de-facto colonies to this day).

By the mid-nineteenth century, Latin America's colonial divisions had largely given way to the nations that exist today (**Figure A.2**), although a series of wars would redraw the national boundaries of several nations into the twentieth century. Among the countries that lost the most territory was Mexico, which lost Central America, Texas, half of the remaining national territory in the Mexican-American War, and later a sliver of the northern border region in the Gadsden Purchase (**Figure A.3**). Bolivia and Paraguay also lost significant portions of their national territory in nineteenth-century wars. Bolivia would also lose more territory during (see Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2).

Latin America's contemporary territorial boundaries were mostly settled by the mid-twentieth century (**Figure A.4**). Most of the remaining conflicts concerned small portions of land along international frontiers. Today, the most significant boundary questions that confront the region are internal secessionist movements and movements that claim indigenous autonomy.





**Figure A.2** Mid-nineteenth-century Latin America

Source: *First Lessons in Geography, or, Introduction to "Youth's Manual of Geography"* by James Monteith (1856). The Baldwin Library of Historical Literature, George A. Smathers Libraries, University of Florida.




Figure A.3 Mexico's Loss of Territory, 1835-1846



Figure A.4 Contemporary Latin America

Proof

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Proof



July 1, 1823	1829-1852	1833-1855	1835-1836	1846-1848	1839-1865
Central American Independence (from Mexico)	Juan Manuel de Rosas is de facto ruler of Argentina	Antonio L&oacute;pez de Santa Anna rules Mexico on eleven different occasions	War for Texas independence	Mexican-American War	Rafael Carrera is de facto ruler of Guatemala

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# Notes

## Introduction: Latin America's Useable Past

- 1 The former is the city's largest urban park, and the latter is Mexico City's historical central square.
- 2 These last designations are typically reserved for persons born in the United States, but they can be found sometimes in the media as descriptions of Mexicans.
- 3 This is a vaguely obscene term for people from Mexico City, commonly used in other parts of the country.
- 4 For our purposes, Latin America comprises Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. For an excellent in-depth discussion of this question, see Marshall Eakin, "Does Latin America Have a Common History" (a pdf is available on the book's website [www.routledge.com/textbooks/dawson](http://www.routledge.com/textbooks/dawson)). See also Thomas Holloway, "Latin America: What's in a Name?" in *A Companion to Latin American History* (Waltham, MA: Wiley/Blackwell, 2008). Benedict Anderson's *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1983) also offers an interesting way of approaching this issue.
- 5 The term often used to describe this phenomenon is orientalism.
- 6 This narrative suggests that Mexicans share a common culture built on the trauma imposed on indigenous cultures by the Spanish Conquest in 1521. It constitutes a chapter in his epic work, *The Labyrinth of Solitude* (New York: Grove, 1961). Claudio Lomnitz' *Exits from The Labyrinth* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1993) represents one of the most interesting critiques of this tradition.
- 7 Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. *Silencing the Past: Power and the Production of History* (Boston: Beacon, 1995).
- 8 For examples of this tradition, see Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Brooke Larson, *Colonialism and Agrarian Transformation in Bolivia: Cochabamba, 1550–1900* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Stephen H. Haber, ed. *How Latin America Fell Behind: Essays on the Economic Histories of Brazil, 1800–1914* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997).
- 9 On this, see the brilliant essay by Clifford Geertz, "History and Anthropology," *New Literary History*, Vol. 21, No. 2, (Winter, 1990), 321–335.
- 10 For more on the concept, see Walter Johnson, "On Agency," *Journal of Social History* 37:1 (Fall 2003). One interesting reading of this question can be found in Vincent Peloso, *Peasants on Plantations: Subaltern Strategies of Labor and Resistance in the Pisco Valley, Peru* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999).

- 11 This is the conclusion some read from reading Michel Foucault. See, for example, Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (New York: Random House, 1975).
- 12 This concept figures prominently in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). Jon Beasley-Murray, offers an idea of how it applies to Latin America in *Posthegemony: Political Theory and Latin America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011).
- 13 I draw from Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977).
- 14 See, for instance, Bernard Goldberg, *Bias: A CBS Insider Exposes How the Media Distort the News*. (New York: Perennial, 2003).

## 1 Independence Narratives, Past and Present

- 1 “Shot Heard Round the World,” by Bob Dorough, *Schoolhouse Rock*, 1976. See <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y6ikO6LMxF4>.
- 2 A good place to start on Sáenz is Sarah Chambers, “Republican Friendship: Manuela Saenz Writes Women into the Nation, 1835–1856,” *Hispanic American Historical Review* 81: 2, 2001, 225–257.
- 3 A free womb law declared that children born to slaves would be free.
- 4 The full letter was nearly 8,000 words long, and can be found in Spanish on the website.
- 5 See it here: <http://vimeo.com/29701339>

## 2 Caudillos Versus the Nation State

- 1 “[T]hey do things differently there.” From Poles Hartley, *The Go-Between* (London: H. Hamilton, 1953).
- 2 This is a system of government where power is controlled by a small number of elites.
- 3 *Mestizo* is a common term in Latin America, indicating a person with both European and Indigenous ancestry. It is often used as a racial category, but is also used as a cultural category, with no reference to physical ancestry.
- 4 Latin American liberals followed the dictates of intellectuals like Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, and believed in maximizing economic and political freedom in the interest of progress.
- 5 The term for the owners of large estates varies from region to region. They and their estates are variously known by the terms *hacendados/haciendas*, *finqueros/fincas*, *estancieros/estancias*, *latifundistas/latifundia*.
- 6 Protectoria de indígenas.
- 7 Facundo was a real *caudillo*, but the text was indirectly aimed at Rosas.
- 8 Shumway, *The Invention of Argentina*, 206.
- 9 This term describes persons from Buenos Aires.
- 10 These are owners of large estates, or *estancias*.
- 11 Florencia Mallon’s *Peasant and Nation* is fascinating on this point.
- 12 The term denotes people of mixed racial origins.
- 13 Translator’s note: The political party that opposed Rosas.
- 14 Translator’s note: In 1820, Juan Manuel de Rosas, leader of the Federalist Party, was given the title of “Restorer of the Laws” by the legislature when he reestablished the Federalists’ legal government.
- 15 Translator’s note: Refers to the British and other fair-haired, light-skinned foreigners, with a pejorative connotation.
- 16 Translator’s note: Crested *caracara* (*Polyborus plancus*), a bird of prey common to Argentina and belonging to the falcon family.