



# Citizenship and Rights in the New Republics

# 3

1861–1865	1862	September 22, 1862	1868–1878	1879–1880	October 7, 1886
Civil War in United States	Slave trade to Cuba ends	President Lincoln issues Emancipation Proclamation in United States	Ten Year War (Cuba)	Julio Roca's Conquest of the desert in Argentina	Full abolition in Cuba

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When the delegates to the French National Constituent Assembly issued the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen* in August 1789, many believed that they sat at a crossroads in human history. Best summed up with the phrase that declared that all “men are born and remain free and equal in rights,” the declaration signaled the convergence of revolutionary fervor and the ideals of perhaps the most important intellectual of the eighteenth century, Jean Jacques Rousseau. Repudiating a history in which rights had been apportioned according to lineage and special status (i.e., membership in a religious order), this document, for the first time, made the citizen the only legitimate possessor of rights. To be sure, the declaration did not include women, and made no mention of freedom for slaves, but it was a hopeful beginning that would animate much of nineteenth- and twentieth-century global history. Since that time, one of the critical stories of humankind has been the struggle to become more free, to extend more rights to more people, and to establish universal standards and practices of justice. Latin America occupies an important place in that story.

In theory, freedom and equality before the law are universal values; ideals that remain valid no matter what the context. In practice, freedom and equality have always been the product of local circumstances. They are rights granted to citizens, who are individuals designated as members of a national community. What is more, while the rights might be universal, the category of “citizen” is invariably particular. Citizenship is extended only to

those who qualify, and denied on the basis of class (property as a precondition of citizenship), gender, age, national origin, and race. In much of Europe during the nineteenth century, one could not be a citizen if one did not belong to the national folk—through language, religion, or customs. In the United States, already an ethnically diverse society, only property-owning white men could become citizens.

Even more, the very question of what set of practices constituted citizenship rights would be the subject of repeated struggles during the course of the century. Political rights—the right to vote, to stand for office, to choose one's rulers counted among many types of contested rights, including the right to free speech, to freedom of religion, to freedom of assembly, to equality before the law, and so on. Added to this were other claims to rights, not always framed according to universal liberal values. Emancipated slaves sometimes demanded the right to recompense for their suffering (perhaps a plot of land, maybe more). Peasants might insist on their right to village autonomy, to the land, timber and water rights they had enjoyed under colonial rule. This expectation, once guaranteed to them as vassals of the king, would be recast as a citizenship claim made by villages that called themselves *comunidades ex-indios* (ex-Indian communities).

Latin Americans faced innumerable obstacles in defining suitable qualities of citizenship in their newly independent republics. Independence represented a kind of freedom—freedom from colonial rule—but in societies with no tradition of liberal rights and such a long history of legally enshrined religious, social, and racial hierarchies, the question of how freedom from colonial rule translated into citizenship rights was a daunting one. Would slaves be emancipated, granted rights equal to those of educated urban elites? Would the indigenous populations of the Andean and Mexican countryside, upon whom rural elites depended for labor, be granted freedom from the tributes that had kept the colonial economy afloat? Would those who did not even speak Spanish or Portuguese, but instead spoke Aymara, Quechua, Nahuatl, or one of over a hundred other indigenous languages, be expected to learn Spanish in order to become a citizen? What too, of the plebian multitudes, working in the mines, plantations, and cities of the formal colonies. Often illiterate and invariably unruly (at least in the eyes of elites), were these people ready to be responsible citizens, to vote wisely?

More vexing still was the question of how women fit into the picture. Women played active roles in the independence wars and years that followed—sometimes as actual combatants, and at others as co-conspirators, merchants, teachers, nurses, artisans, financiers and defenders of social and cultural institutions. It remained to be seen whether this might translate into any sort of acknowledgement of their right to citizenship, especially because the male-dominated political assemblies that wrote the constitutions and passed the laws also invariably assumed that the role of proper women was in the home, fulfilling the private function of family reproduction while their men dominated the public sphere.

## Caste Systems

While Latin Americans would for the most part defer struggles over gender rights until well into the twentieth century, race and caste were critical categories in the citizenship debates of the early republican period. Colonial society was predicated on caste hierarchies (in late

colonial Mexico there were at least eighteen caste categories) that determined where one lived, which occupations were available, and one's opportunities for marriage, political, and social advancement. Whites were at the top of those hierarchies, though the *criollos* (Europeans born in the Americas) who took power in the new republics were not always supporters of these forms of distinction, as they often felt the sting of standing second to peninsular Spaniards. In the immediate aftermath of independence, utopian liberals in various parts of the region tried to strike down all barriers (again, except those that excluded women), pushing through emancipation declarations, prohibitions of the caste system, and constitutions that granted nearly universal citizenship rights to adult males.

These were, however, idealistic moments. The law in Latin America has a long history of acting as a projection of how society might function, and not so much as a prescription for how it will function, and these laws were no exception. The urban, educated, middle-class and elite liberals who wrote these constitutions could not, for the most part, imagine people of the lower castes as their equals, and with independence formal discrimination would gradually be replaced by unofficial practices that accomplished the same ends. In some cases (in Peru in 1826, for example), old systems of tribute and forced labor would be reintroduced by states in need of resources, and in others informal exclusionary practices would simply supersede formal ones.

As ideas emanating from Europe and North America about the biological differences between the races gained purchase in Latin America, the old systems of hierarchy were gradually remade into new systems of direct exclusion based on categories created by scientific racism. European theorists argued variously that the different races descended from different origins (i.e., Samuel Von Sommering), that different groups had innately different abilities (i.e., Johann Blumenbach), that the mixing of races led to the degeneration of the species (i.e., Arthur de Gobineau), and that society was responsible for maintaining and improving the gene pool (i.e., Francis Galton). These ideas were adopted unevenly in Latin America, particularly by those who hoped to redeem the indigenous, black, and mixed majorities in most societies in the region, but the influences of new sciences like eugenics, phrenology, and craniometry were unmistakable during the nineteenth century. Scientific racism allowed a colonial system favoring cleanliness of the blood (*limpieza de sangre*—a hierarchical system based on one's ability to claim blood untainted by the infidels) to give way to a modern system in which whiteness was a scientific virtue. Whites were smarter, more rational, more fit to govern, and more fit to be citizens of any society. For those most in the thrall of these ideas, Blacks, Indians, Asians, and those of mixed racial origins were a burden at best and a threat to civilization at worst.

The rise of racial thinking in much of the region had the effect of naturalizing past hierarchies in novel ways, substituting the power of modern science for what was once a religiously justified system of social differentiation (old Christians, those who could trace their lineage entirely to Spain, being closer to God). Drawing on the ways in which Western culture has long naturalized presumed differences between men and women—men as aggressive, sexual, public beings and women as passive, chaste, and private—the racial hierarchies of the nineteenth century reinvigorated caste distinctions to justify a civic culture dominated by white, elite males. And just as these gendered practices pathologized women who entered the public sphere as dishonorable (all work in some way being tantamount to prostitution, justifying the assumption ~~that the woman undertaking the work had loose~~

~~sexual morals, unless she was a widow~~), these hierarchies justified the active exclusion from public life of all those deemed racially unworthy. Unless they could prove their virtue (a virtue that was presumed for most whites) the *mestizo* peddler, worker, or merchant, was not to be trusted, suspected of being a scoundrel, and certainly not suitable for public office.

In practice, this meant that the elite males who dominated public life tended to assume that the mixed race and indigenous women who worked for them, as servants, raising their children as nannies, laboring in their workshops and fields, were invariably open to their sexual advances, not sufficiently chaste in any event that their sexual depredations counted for much. They assumed something similar for the formerly *casta* males who made life in the new republics possible through their work, though in this case assumptions about loose morals were made into assumptions that they should be treated with suspicion. Ironically, even tragically, those very same males tended to reproduce these sensibilities when they did manage to ascend the class hierarchy. One of the greatest prizes a *mestizo* male could gain was a wife who was whiter than himself, the surest guarantee of both her virtue and a better future for his children.

Troubled by the prospects for their nations to become civilized because of the racial makeup of their societies, Latin American elites undertook any number of projects to improve the race. Where possible, they gradually erased the stain of blackness or Indianness through intermarriage or reclassification. As late as 1838, Afro-Argentines represented 25 percent of the population of Buenos Aires, but by 1887 they were counted as only 2 percent of the city's residents. Many were reclassified as *trigueño*, or "wheat colored." Others hoped for redemption through education, modernization, hygiene, nutrition, healthy motherhood, and any number of other improvements, believing that if they could elevate the poor, racially compromised masses out of their civilizational slumber, their societies might prosper. Their vision was not so much egalitarian as it was rooted in a history of Catholic paternalism, of helping defenseless and pathetic vassals.

Others took a darker view of the racial divide. Nationalists in Peru drew on the Inca past for their symbols even as they actively despised living Indians. In the minds of *Limeños* (and for that matter highlanders), the regional geography of the country was also indelibly racial—a white/*mestizo* city and coast confronted the Indian highlands and countryside. This deep fragmentation would ultimately harden into the system Peruvians called *gamonalismo*, in which the landlords and merchants who controlled the highlands like feudal kingdoms were tolerated both because they delivered loyalty to the national government, and because *Limeños* had little faith in the capacity of Andean peoples for citizenship.

The racial geographies of places like Mexico and Argentina were less well defined, as most of rural Mexico and the pampas had indeterminate racial origins. Where, however, race could be clearly linked to a region's identity, it was sometimes turned to genocidal ends. In Chiapas, the Indian highlanders who were forced into *enganche* (forced contract) labor on the coastal coffee plantations earned little sympathy from outsiders. In Mexico's North, the government of Porfirio Díaz forcibly moved approximately 15,000 Yaquis from their homes in Sonora and condemned them to labor on henequen plantations in the Yucatán following their military defeat at the hands of the army in the early 1900s. Julio Roca's Conquest of the Desert in Argentina (1879–1880) was informed by similar attitudes towards race, and left over 1,300 indigenous dead. In these cases, the clearing of indigenous lands left new territory open for white speculators and settlers to turn to "productive" ends.

Indigenous peoples were left in a series of binds by these conflicts. Though some tried to appropriate the language of liberalism, demanding their rights as citizens, fighting in national wars (as mentioned in Chapter 2, thousands of indigenous Mexicans fought in Benito Juárez' liberal armies against the French invasion of Mexico, 1861–1867), they were hamstrung in a variety of ways. Liberal elites were not inclined to recognize the participation of racial others in their great national struggles. They erased them from their historical memory once they consolidated power. Neither were popular groups served well by their own versions of liberal rights. When peasant or indigenous villagers came to the liberal cause, they generally interpreted the right to freedom to mean village autonomy. Individual rights were transformed into the right of local communities to set their own laws, to live free of interference from the outside world. Just as importantly, indigenous peoples were as likely to be tied up in fratricidal struggles with neighboring communities as they were national or international elites. The net result was that indigenous peoples were increasingly excluded from national politics, which was instead dominated by those who saw the Indian, the *mestizo*, the peasant, as little more than fodder for their own dreams.

The break-up of communal peasant villages, accomplished mainly by liberal states which had relied on these same peasants to consolidate their hold on power, would be one of the great tragedies of the nineteenth century and a source of enduring grievances into the twentieth. Across the region land surveyors, speculators, and investors took advantage of liberal legislation to gobble up a great deal of land that was deemed vacant, largely because it was occupied by indigenous peoples. Former peasants were increasingly thrust onto the labor market, forced to work in export agriculture as debt peons<sup>1</sup> or day laborers. This in turn is part of the reason why village autonomy would remain a critical peasant demand across the region for generations to come (including in violent conflicts in Mexico in 1910, Bolivia in 1952, Peru in 1968, and arguably in Mexico in 1994).

The emerging *mestizo* majorities in many parts of the region fared somewhat differently under these circumstances, though not always markedly better. Most could distance themselves from their indigenous ancestry, and early republican constitutions in much of the region were sufficiently radical in their democratic vision to call for their participation as equals with their former social betters. Nonetheless, over time elite interests favored a hardening of social hierarchies in ways that made it difficult for people of plebian origin to rise, especially once the military conflicts of the mid-century (which created opportunities for the ambitious to rise both through military service and because of instability within the elites) gave way to stable elites who reproduced themselves through nepotism and increasingly narrow political networks. Should a poor *mestizo* or mulatto<sup>2</sup> succeed in business or school (or even a poor indigenous peasant, for that matter), they might be accepted within polite society (this distinguishing Latin America from the US), but the odds of success were invariably low, and lower still as the free-for-all of the caudillo era retreated into the distant past.

## The Stain

Slaves created the first republic in the Caribbean. Just fifty miles away, emancipation would take nearly an entire century longer. This contrast reminds us that the story of freedom and citizenship is a varied one across the Americas, invariably rooted in local histories, cultures,

and circumstances. Those places where slavery was not a centrally important institution generally produced different kinds of histories than those where it was.

Slaves could be found in most parts of the region at the beginning of the nineteenth century. On the eve of independence, there were 30,000 slaves in La Plata, 78,000 in New Granada, 64,500 in Venezuela, and 89,000 in Peru. They worked on Peruvian sugar plantations and wineries, on cacao and sugar estates in Venezuela, in Colombian gold mines, and on ranches in Argentina. They were also common in urban areas, toiling as servants, and skilled and unskilled workers. In most places they were important, but not critical sources of labor, often working alongside free laborers. By contrast, plantation agriculture in the Caribbean and Brazil relied on slavery for its very existence. In Brazil, slaves were also critical to gold and diamond mining in Minas Gerais, and to an emerging coffee economy in and around São Paulo.

It is not really sufficient to describe societies in the region as characterized by the presence or absence of slaves. Across the Americas there were too many distinctions even within slavery to do this. Take the United States, for instance. In the nineteenth century, the United States had a slave population that was unlike any other. Whereas in most of Latin America a considerable percentage of slaves were of African origin, in the United States the vast majority of slaves were native born. Perhaps because of the historical cost of importing slaves and the relative poverty of U.S. plantation societies, North America had only a marginal presence in the history of the slave trade, importing something like 500,000 slaves over several centuries (4.4 percent of the total, as compared to the 4 million imported to Brazil, which represented 35 percent of the total).

The slave population of the United States was among the largest in the Americas in the early nineteenth century, but that population was the product of natural increase and extremely low levels of manumission. Because so few slaves were ever freed, to be black in the United States (and particularly the South) was almost certainly to be a slave. Miscegenation produced more blacks, more slaves. The fact that many slaves had some European ancestry was simply ignored. Furthermore, those who were free were generally treated almost as badly as slaves (except, to some extent, in Louisiana). Among other prohibitions, many Southern states forbade free persons of color from becoming preachers, selling certain goods, tending bar, staying out past a certain time of night, or owning dogs.

Just a few hundred miles away, Haiti's history of slavery was quite different. A marginal colony until the end of the seventeenth century, during the eighteenth century St. Domingue emerged as one of the richest colonies in the world, due to a booming sugar plantation complex and the importation of 790,000 slaves. The story of Haitian independence was told in Chapter 1, but it is worth recalling that unlike in the United States, slavery and race were not entirely contiguous in Haiti. In fact, much of the wealth in the colony was in the hands of free people of color. Their role in independence was ambiguous. Free blacks first struggled for rights for themselves. As slave-owners, they were not universally in favor of emancipation. Over time some free blacks came to embrace emancipation, either because they genuinely believed in the cause, or because the offer of freedom could be used to recruit slaves to their side in the civil war that engulfed Haiti during the 1790s.

Across a narrow straight, slavery remained essential to a colonial Cuban economy well into the nineteenth century. With the demise of the sugar industry in Haiti, Cuban planters

grew more cane, and imported more slaves. Still, while slavery played a critical role in maintaining Cuba's colonial status early in the century, the logics that underpinned this option gradually grew less compelling after the 1820s. North American investment began to supplant the power of Spanish capital, and the Cuban population grew more diverse (in part due to European immigration, which government officials promoted in an effort to dilute the African blood of the island's population). As the British government intensified its pressure on the slave trade, Cuban planters began to look elsewhere for labor. By mid-century the planters in Santa Clara and Matanzas (the most prosperous sugar zones) were importing indentured Chinese laborers in significant numbers. Even so, Cuban planters imported 400,000 slaves between 1835 and 1864.<sup>3</sup>

Cuba's booming economy enriched a growing number of free blacks. Black professionals and petty merchants with middle-class aspirations shaped the face of a changing Havana, and like elsewhere, offered models of upward mobility for other free but poor blacks. This caused alarm in some quarters, and colonial officials ultimately tightened caste restrictions, making it harder for blacks to move up the social ladder and also restricting the movement of people of color onto and off of the island. Fearing that Cuban and foreign blacks were fomenting rebellion among the slaves, royal officials launched a major campaign against free blacks in 1844 (the *escalera*), in which they arrested two thousand and exiled several hundred. The *escalera* set the tone for at least one aspect of emancipation in Cuba: free people of color were increasingly made into objects of fear and the targets of official discrimination as slavery came to an end.

In Brazil, government officials did the opposite, loosening colonial era restrictions that limited the upward mobility of free people of color in response to an upwardly mobile Afro-Brazilian population. By the mid-nineteenth century, *libertos* (former slaves) even enjoyed the right to vote as long as they met property qualifications. Non-whites could be found across the professions, in government, and among the nation's most important writers and intellectuals by the 1870s, and faced no formal social prohibitions. To be sure, mulattos generally fared better in society than blacks, but by this time most discrimination in Brazil was informal, outside of the law.

As international pressure brought the slave trade to an end, the patterns of slavery across the hemisphere changed. Slavery became more rural, more closely tied to the most profitable export commodities (cotton in the United States, coffee in Brazil, sugar in Cuba), more absent from daily life in the cities and rare in less prosperous regions. Cuba was an increasingly divided place, as some regions depended even more on slavery than they had in the past, and others increasingly did not rely on slavery at all. Complicating this situation further, a growing number of Cubans openly argued for both freedom from Spain and freedom from slavery, identifying both as a kind of bonded servitude that crippled the nation. The racist elements of this sentiment were sometimes explicit. Many whites believed that the continued presence of large numbers of black slaves represented a barrier to Cuba becoming a modern nation.

Slaves and former slaves were active participants in this struggle. Runaway slaves and slave revolts in Cuba and elsewhere in the Caribbean reminded Cuban whites of the injustices of the institution. *Cofradias* (fraternal societies organized by slaves and former slaves) kept pressure on the system by raising funds to purchase freedom and agitating for rights. Whenever laws were passed to ameliorate the harshest conditions of slavery in Cuba, slaves

used their extensive oral networks to pass the news. Once armed with this knowledge, slaves actively challenged their overseers and claimed whatever rights they believed they had. The refusal of overseers to respect those rights (which in some cases may be as simple as the right to talk back) could at times ignite a volatile situation. Moreover, planters could be put at a severe disadvantage by these information networks. Rumor and speculation could transform relatively minor reforms into something much more significant. Whispers of imminent emancipation (and the belief that planters were defying orders from above) helped launch the Haitian revolution, revolts in Barbados (1816), Demerara (1823; now part of Guyana), and Jamaica (1831).<sup>4</sup>

The issue of slavery came to a head during Cuba's independence wars, beginning with the Ten Years War (1868–1878). The war took place largely in Oriente, a relatively poor and remote region of the island at the time. Perhaps because Oriente had relatively few sugar *ingenios* (mills), and thus relatively few slaves, both the rebels and Spanish promised freedom to Afro-Cubans who fought on their side. Neither side imagined extensive emancipation, but slaves actively joined both in significant numbers. Fearing that the rebels in the Oriente were going to emancipate all the slaves, the wealthy sugar planters in Santa Clara and Matanzas remained resolutely in the royalist camp during the war.

Even though limited to eastern Cuba, the war did initiate the process of emancipation, and once it began it was hard to reverse. The international slave trade had ended. Along with Brazil, Cuba was one of only two places in the Americas where slavery remained legal. Furthermore, low reproduction rates on the island meant that the competition for slaves would only become more fierce. Those with sufficient resources turned to other (principally Chinese) forms of labor servitude. For their part, former slaves pressed the system with increasing confidence, pooling their resources to purchase the freedom of friends and relatives, and pressuring the judicial authorities whenever they could to limit abuses and punish masters who broke the law. Slavery was becoming unworkable.

During the war (in 1870), the Spanish *Cortes* passed the Moret Law, which declared that all individuals born on the island henceforth would be born free, though the law required a twenty-two-year apprenticeship for children born to slave mothers. Under increasing pressure from abolitionists, including former slaves, ten years later the Spanish *Cortes* passed a law calling for gradual abolition, which included an eight-year period of indentured servitude for the former slaves (this was called the *patronato*). Increasingly unwilling to allow any limits to their freedom, slaves challenged the *patronato* with such effectiveness that it was abolished two years early on October 7, 1886. Slavery in Cuba had come to its end (see Table 3.1).

The active role that slaves played in their own emancipation in Cuba is striking, in part because Cuba seems to stand out from societies like the United States and Brazil. This is, however, probably more a result of the stories we privilege than it is a sign that emancipation in Cuba was unique. In all cases in the Americas, emancipation was a complex story of pressures from the outside world, internal elite conflicts, and pressure from slaves themselves. In Cuba, as in Haiti, slaves took hold of their freedom in the context of civil wars. In the United States, cross-class unity among whites limited the ways blacks could participate in the Civil War, but pressure from former slaves helped to mobilize northern whites against the abomination of slavery.

In Brazil, the story of emancipation is similarly complex. The first real pressures on Brazilian slavery came from abroad. As early as 1815, the Portuguese crown submitted to British




Figure 3.1 Political map of Cuba

Table 3.1 Emancipation in the Americas

Country	Dates
Haiti	1793
Argentina	1813 (free womb), 1851 (full)
Chile	1823
Mexico	1829
Venezuela	1830 (children), 1854 (full)
Bolivia	1831
British colonies	1833
Uruguay	1842
Danish colonies	1847
French colonies	1848
Colombia	1851
Peru	1854
Ecuador	1854
Dutch colonies	1863
United States	1865
Cuba	1870 (free womb), 1886 (full)
Brazil	1871 (free womb), 1888 (full)
Puerto Rico	1873

pressure to limit the Atlantic slave trade, and in the 1830s the Imperial state formally agreed to a process that would gradually end the trade. Still, until the British pressured Brazil into abolishing the legal slave trade in 1851, Brazilian slave imports remained robust. During the nineteenth century, Brazil imported 1.3 million slaves, including 371,000 in the ten years prior

to the end of the trade. The United States, by contrast, imported just 51,000 slaves during the nineteenth century. Brazil suffered some spectacular slave rebellions during these years (especially in 1835, in Bahia), and public sentiment gradually turned against slavery. Brazilian liberals also believed the country's failings in their war with Paraguay during the 1860s were a result of slavery. Nonetheless, slavery remained sufficiently important to the economies of the northeast, south, and southwest of the country that abolition seemed unlikely.

Around this time, changing patterns in the global economy—namely, the end of a global market for slaves—began to undermine the economics of slavery in Brazil. After 1851 the percentage of slaves in the labor force and their importance as a source of capital began to decline. As access to slaves became more limited, they were increasingly concentrated around a few commodities. Slaves were transferred from declining regions (like the northeast) to the more robust coffee and mining regions (particularly Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais). Although São Paulo had one of the most robust coffee economies in the country, planters there increasingly recruited European and Asian migrants, relying less on slaves (coffee exports would surpass sugar by the 1850s). São Paulo was soon followed by other regions, as a growing number of planters and miners sought to reduce their reliance on slavery, not because it was unprofitable, but because most believed that their long-term survival depended on finding new sources of labor. By 1884 slaves accounted for more than 10 percent of the population in less than half of Brazil's provinces, and in the northeast slave populations were comparable to what they were in the United States North around the time of abolition (5 percent of the total). As these shifts became more pronounced, the moral arguments against slavery gradually gained more adherents.

After a series of failed efforts, the Brazilian Parliament eventually passed a free womb law (the Rio Branco Law) in 1871. The law established a fund to purchase the freedom of slaves, though it required the "free" children of slaves to work for their masters to the age of twenty-one, and compensated slave-owners for their losses. Inadequate though it was, it did signal the eventual end of slavery. Wealthy planters redoubled their efforts to find alternative labor sources, and opponents resolved to put more pressure on the system. Over the course of the next fifteen years, slaves and former slaves protested, marched, and pressured the Imperial government to end slavery, forming the backbone of a popular abolitionist movement. Black and mulatto intellectuals wrote extensive tracts decrying the evils of slavery. Free black dockworkers and others struck or otherwise mobilized against slavery. In response, local governments in several regions passed acts of emancipation, declaring slavery-free zones. Ceará declared itself a free state in 1884, followed by Amazonas in 1885. In the South, a November 1886 strike by free workers forced the city of Santos to declare itself free. By the end of the year, the city housed 10,000 runaway slaves (see Figure 3.2).

White liberals also participated, writing letters to the newspapers, traveling to slave plantations to monitor the conditions of slaves and report abuses, and as a result of these combined pressures, slavery became increasingly untenable—a system that was driving the country towards chaos. Attempting to stave off this threat, the Brazilian Parliament passed a law freeing all slaves over sixty-five in 1885, and then its Golden Law—emancipation without recompense to the owners for Brazil's 723,000 remaining slaves—in 1888. By this time three-quarters of Brazil's slaves toiled in the three major coffee provinces of São Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Rio de Janeiro.



Figure 3.2 Territorial boundaries and major cities of Brazil

### Different Paths

Critics of slavery in the nineteenth century described this institution as not simply a stain on humankind, but as hopelessly antiquated and ultimately unproductive. The historical record from Cuba and elsewhere, however, suggests something to the contrary. Here, as in Brazil, slaves worked alongside free laborers, in skilled and unskilled positions, and often in industries that produced immense profits. Cultural attachments to systems of forced labor aside, the capital slave owners had tied up in slaves was extremely productive. The problems they faced came from an increasingly fragile supply chain and an increasingly powerful opposition. Where the rate of natural increase in the slave population could replace

existing labors, slavery could have continued indefinitely. Where the slave trade was critical to maintaining the labor force, slavery's days were numbered.

Why did Cuban and Brazilian planters rely so heavily on the slave trade to replenish their supply of slaves? In part it was simply because the trade had always been more developed in these areas, bringing in more slaves. In part it was because the life span of slaves on plantations in these regions was shorter than in the United States. More than half of Brazilian slaves died within the first three years of arriving. Life expectancies for slaves were two-thirds that of whites (in the United States it was 90 percent of whites). This would seem to suggest a more benign slavery in North America, but such comparisons can be deceiving.

Because slaves were more costly the further one got from West African slave markets, planters in the United States had more incentive to see that their slaves lived long lives. Likewise, slaves in the United States tended to work on smaller plantations and in smaller numbers than elsewhere, meaning that each slave's value to their owner as a percentage of their overall capital tended to be greater. This also meant that a North American planter had more economic incentive than a Brazilian planter to see a son born of a slave as a unit of production. A Brazilian slave-owner may have been less concerned about the health of an easily replaced slave than his North American counterpart, but they were also more willing to consider manumission. Legally enforceable contracts in which slaves and their masters agreed to a price for freedom were relatively common in Brazil. They had no history in the United States. Furthermore, in both contexts slaves who worked as household servants, or on small estates where they enjoyed face-to-face relationships with their owners, would have experienced slavery far differently than those who worked on large commercial estates.

One of the rather significant differences among these societies—and one that would have important implications for the rights blacks acquired after slavery—lay in the ways that race and slavery were linked. Unlike in the United States, in Brazil and Cuba slavery and race were never coterminous. In Cuba, the population of free blacks during the nineteenth century amounted to 39 percent of the people of African origin on the island. In Brazil it was more than 75 percent. The urban working class of cities like Rio de Janeiro included significant numbers of free blacks. Free people of color also worked in agriculture, owned land, even owned slaves. In Bahia, Afro-Brazilians owned both sugar plantations and slaves in significant numbers.

In Brazil the black population as a whole was never isolated within a single social system (Table 3.2). In the United States the opposite happened. North American planters used the fear that emancipation stirred among southern whites to build a regional coalition with poor whites (almost none of whom owned slaves) in defense of slavery, playing on the theme of a unified white southern culture threatened by black savagery. In Brazil (particularly in Rio and São Paulo, where most slave holding was concentrated) slave owners did not try to produce these regional cross-class coalitions opposing abolition. Brazilian elites feared the racially heterogeneous masses that characterized their countryside and cities, and preferred to keep them out of the political battles of the day as much as possible. These differences were played out in the different sorts of processes that unfolded around emancipation. For example, the anxieties that led whites in the state of Delaware to vote against compensated emancipation in 1861—in spite of the fact that there were only 2,000 slaves in

**Table 3.2** The eve of emancipation: United States, Cuba, Haiti, Brazil

Country	Total Population	Free People of Color	Slaves
Haiti (1789)	523,000	28,000	465,000
USA (1860)	31,443,321	488,070	3,953,760
Cuba (1862)	1,396,530	232,433	370,533
Brazil (1872)	9,930,000	4,250,000	1,510,000

the state—did not emerge in Brazil, where emancipation became a multilayered **negation**. Here, representatives from the states of Pernambuco and Bahia (where between 12 and 20 percent of the population were slaves) supported the Rio Branco law because it seemed like a reasonable strategy for maintaining elite control while managing what seemed like an inevitable change. Limited concessions to the poor would reduce the likelihood of conflicts that might overturn the entire social structure.

## Rights and the Color Line

The history of the denial of rights to people of color in the United States is well known. After a brief period during which blacks in the defeated South embraced the franchise and a radical Republican Congress tried to punish a recalcitrant South by letting former slaves, carpetbaggers, and scalawags take the reins of government, northern reformers gradually retreated and southern whites created local political systems characterized by the Black Codes, Jim Crow Laws, the Ku Klux Klan, and a landscape where the threat of lynching was ever present. The cross-class alliance that defined the secessionist movement evolved into a political alliance rooted in anti-black hysteria. American historians generally agree that all but the most enlightened of thinkers never really believed African Americans deserved equal citizenship rights, and that in the North as well as the South blacks had few opportunities to press for their legal rights during the ensuing century. Equally important, in the United States the “one drop rule,” was enforced rigorously across the country, eliminating the possibility that miscegenation might entail a proliferation of categories. If you had a black ancestor, you were black.

Latin American societies did not generally see a legal codification of discrimination based on race, a fact that many Latin American nationalists have long used to argue that their nations are more enlightened when it comes to matters of race. Some have even taken this as evidence that Latin Americans are not really racists (the Brazilian Gilberto Freyre and Mexican Manuel Gamio are famous examples). Early in the twentieth century, North American blacks who visited Brazil described their experiences there as a welcome relief from what they experienced at home. Still, the absence of violent codified discrimination did not exactly translate into the existence of enforceable rights, in Brazil, Cuba, or anywhere else. Former slaves across the Americas confronted a great deal of prejudice, lived in an era of virulent scientific racism, and, at the very least, faced the prospects of being very poor in poor countries; nations without the means to ameliorate their poverty even had they possessed the will.

Because the states that governed post-emancipation societies were weak, local power brokers determined the terms and nature of labor arrangements. Coercive but somewhat flexible labor systems like debt peonage, share cropping, and contract labor prevailed in many areas, and the political connections between landowners and political elites undermined most efforts to enforce existing labor laws or the civil rights of newly emancipated citizens. Planters in Cuba, Mexico, Jamaica, Brazil, and elsewhere also turned to migrant labor to meet their needs. As a result, some former slaves were left without any form of work.

The experience of former slaves in Brazil differed a great deal depending on where they lived. In São Paulo, slaves tended to move away from their former masters. The *libertos* (former slaves) in this part of Brazil often demanded respect, an end to corporal punishment, appreciation for their family units, and wages that planters would not offer. In response, local planters created a series of obstacles that blocked their efforts to enter the growing urban and agricultural workforce. Planters and the state worked together to flood the São Paulo labor market with subsidized immigrants, hoping that they could avoid employing what they viewed as uppity former slaves. Nonetheless, the system of subsidized immigration was phased out in a few years, and the new immigrants found their footing and moved into better jobs, leaving former slaves with a multitude of opportunities to join São Paulo's agricultural and emerging industrial workforce.

Elsewhere in Brazil, former slaves were left to the mercy of changing economic conditions, finding employment and a measure of autonomy in regions where dynamic economic growth offered new opportunities, and finding themselves as vulnerable as ever in regions where economic decline meant that jobs were scarce. In Bahia, by the late nineteenth century one of Brazil's poorest regions, former slaves often remained tied to their former owners, working on their estates as agricultural laborers, only migrating away from estates that suffered economic catastrophes in the aftermath of emancipation.

These distinct experiences helped produce a series of new images of Brazil that would supplant older ones. The northeast (poor, black, remote from the capital, tropical) came to be understood as a backwards region, filled with people not exactly ready for citizenship. Rio de Janeiro (the capital, the intellectual and cultural center) and São Paulo (the engine of economic growth and industry) came to be imagined as both less black and more modern than the rest of the country. It did not make sense for Brazilians to create formal systems of racial discrimination, as the northeast-southwest distinction did not align perfectly with racial classifications, and the centuries-old free-black community in Brazil had both intermarried with Europeans and produced its own share of wealthy, prestigious families. Instead, what Brazilians saw was the emergence of a series of softer designations that could maintain the hierarchies that existed under slavery. These soft gradations also allowed Brazilians to embrace the image of Brazil as a racially mixed society. Somewhere between the rich white *paulista*<sup>5</sup> and poor black *nordestina*<sup>6</sup> was a mulatto, sometimes rich, sometimes poor, and sometimes a little of both.

On the national level, many former slaves supported the monarchy as a potential ally in the fight against discrimination and for voting and other rights, largely because the monarchy had been behind many anti-slavery measures over the years. This alliance was short lived, however, because elites in Rio de Janeiro, along with *paulista* planters, conspired to overthrow the crown and create a republic in 1889. Power in the new republic was highly

decentralized, and while the only restrictions on male suffrage were literacy, politics increasingly became an entirely elite affair, with very little popular participation. Brazilians of color first tried to defend their old allies through a series of black guards, and later tried to organize independently in defense of their rights in newly formed clubs and militias, but the new elites aggressively put down all forms of popular mobilization. The new planter state, in effect, eliminated the one element of the government to which Brazilian blacks had looked for support. Moreover, because people of African ancestry could hope to move up the social hierarchy by acquiring wealth, prestige, and power, after 1889 a confrontational struggle for civil rights gave way to more individualized strategies of advancement. If you followed the rules of the system, you might get ahead. If you protested, you were certain to be left behind.

Such was not the case in Cuba. Former slaves in Cuba did what slaves did elsewhere. They focused on creating stable families and communities in the aftermath of an experience that had denied them both, and often left political organizing for individual rights for later. Many moved eastward to Oriente, away from the sugar zones of Santa Clara and Matanzas ~~in search of a better life~~. Still, when Cuba's final war for independence broke out in 1895, thousands of free blacks joined in. Their participation reminds us that the meaning of freedom to slaves was neither universal nor simply tied to bondage. Veterans of those battles would repeatedly insist that, having spilt blood for Cuban independence, they were entitled to the full rights of citizenship, along with specific privileges as a reward for their sacrifices.

Cuba's 1902 Constitution granted all adult males the right to vote, regardless of color, but when Afro-Cuban veterans insisted that this right and their service be respected in meaningful ways, white Cubans responded by trying to erase those contributions, and by increasingly defining blackness as a threat to the nation. The Cubans of color who demanded their rights as citizens, who demanded a share of positions in the bureaucracy, representation among elected officials, and the elimination of discrimination against blacks, were increasingly cast as dangerous primitives, threats to national progress.

Cuba was thus like Brazil in that Cuban whites did not formally exclude all blacks from positions of privilege based on the qualities of their blood. They instead focused on a series of practices, specifically Afro-Cuban religious traditions, arguing that significant numbers of former slaves were unfit for civilization. As in Brazil, where *capoeira*<sup>7</sup> was criminalized during the nineteenth century, Afro-Cuban religious traditions became a particular target. Images of the black Cuban as non-Christian, as a practitioner of witchcraft, of animal and human sacrifices, and particularly of the kidnapping of white children for the purposes of ritual sacrifice, filled Cuban newspapers in the early years after independence (Figure 3.3). Police, scientists, criminologists, and elected officials railed against a perceived epidemic of savagery, and in the process laid the groundwork for recasting thousands of patriotic veterans (and citizens) as threats to the nation. The two processes were intertwined; the more Afro-Cubans demanded rights, the more Cubans were subjected to stories of strange rituals and the kidnapping of white children.

Unbowed by the racist attacks, Afro-Cubans continued to organize for civil rights, rights built around a complex mix of universal values and rights won through the struggle. In 1908 Evaristo Estenoz, Pedro Ivonet, Gregorio Surín and several others founded the *Partido Independiente de Color* (Independent Party of Color, PIC), which was mainly made up of veterans of the wars for independence. The PIC was the first race-based political party in the Americas, and was banned by the Cuban Congress shortly after it was founded (incidentally,

# La justicia del pueblo



## CASTIGANDO EL CRIMEN

**Figure 3.3** "Justice by the people: punishing the crime" political cartoon

Source: Courtesy of Alejandra Bronfman

the Morúa Amendment, the law that made the PIC illegal by banning parties based on race or class, was proposed by an Afro-Cuban). PIC supporters did not back down, continuing to protest for rights after the Morúa Law was passed. Their opponents were similarly resolute, describing the PIC as seditious, barbaric, and suggesting that its members represented threats to the virtue of white women. The conflict came to a head after a series of protests in May 1912, which were reported in the press as the opening salvos of a race war that would imperil the nation. In the following weeks some party supporters and poor peasants did engage in violent protests, but the response by the Cuban army was swift and decisive. Perhaps as many as 6,000 PIC supporters were massacred, and the party was wiped out.

### The Documents: Limiting Citizenship

What was to happen after emancipation? Post-emancipation societies were simultaneously driven by nineteenth-century liberalism, the claim that all men should be free and equal before the law, and nineteenth-century scientific racism, the insistence that some men were

destined to rule, and others be ruled. This was the world in which all former slaves negotiated not just their freedom, but the rights that derived from their erstwhile status as citizens within free republics. People of color were not denied a voice in this process, as they might have been under slavery, in part because by the time emancipation came in Latin America's two most significant slave-holding societies, both countries also housed a significant population of literate, free people of color who made the most of these developments, whether by taking advantage of their new rights to pursue their own interests, or by organizing for an expanding series of rights.

It is no coincidence that the new freedoms granted Afro-Latin Americans were accompanied by a powerful conservative response designed to create new bases for limiting the opportunities emancipated slaves enjoyed. One of the significant early examples of this came in the form of *The Fetishist Animism of the Bahian Blacks*, a book written by Raimundo Nina Rodrigues (Document 3.1). Nina Rodrigues (1862–1906) was one of Brazil's most important social scientists, psychiatrists, and interpreters of race during the emancipation era. His work is notable for his darkly negative view of blacks and somewhat kinder rendering of mulattos, a tendency that some scholars explain as due to the fact that Nina Rodrigues was a mulatto. It may be that he was, and it may also be the case that his enemies called him a mulatto in order to discredit his work. We do not know with any certainty.

Nina Rodrigues distinguished himself from his colleagues in the United States by taking a positive view of mulattos. He saw them as backwards, but redeemable, whereas North American intellectuals generally viewed mulattos as racially degenerate, criminal, and lazy, and thus immune to improvement. Though strongly influenced by the Italian criminologist Césaire Lombroso in the ways he links race, culture, and crime, Nina Rodrigues also believed that Brazilian blacks might become civilized through the intervention of the state. Race in his work is something more fluid, less essential, than it was in the work of North Americans. It created challenges and obstacles that needed to be overcome, but race was not destiny.

Nina Rodrigues' work, widely read in Latin America, was particularly influential on the Cuban criminologist Fernando Ortiz. Working within a milieu in which North American ideas of racial separation and Afro-Cuban demands for rights came into constant conflict, Ortiz' scholarly writings and work as a public official helped to shift the terrain on which Cubans struggled for their rights. Rather than denying rights based upon race, Ortiz, with the collaboration of a series of newspapers and other public officials, highlighted the dangers that Afro-Cuban religions represented to civilization. Drawing from a series of grotesque images, Ortiz' work created the impression that Afro-Cubans were not Christian, were cannibalistic and dangerous, and needed to be controlled. The resulting stigmatization of blackness created immense problems for Afro-Cuban activists and veterans. When organized for civil rights based on the fact that they faced discrimination for being black (see Document 3.2), they wound up highlighting their blackness, and further white hysteria over the black threat.

It is within this context that Document 3.3 must be read. It was written in the aftermath of the massacre of 1912, when it became impossible to organize a party around blackness. Some Afro-Cubans responded to these events by asserting that they were, indeed, civilized. Some eschewed separatist politics (Nicolás Guillén, senator and father of the poet, for example), insisting that there was no real racism in Cuba and that they were happy to

work within the system. Others denied the claim that all Afro-Cubans practiced *brujeria* (witchcraft), using Nina Rodrigues' own logic to argue that they had erased their racial origins, and deserved to be treated as honorable and civilized. Fernando Guerra, however, was one of many who openly defended Afro-Cuban religious forms. Guerra represents a particularly interesting case, because he was in fact in close contact with Fernando Ortiz and eventually invited Ortiz to Lucumí ceremonies and initiated him into the religion. Having seen these eloquent defenses and participated in the rituals, Ortiz later muted his criticisms of Lucumí.

Documents 3.4 and 3.5 take us back in time and to the issue of citizenship rights as they pertained to women. They come from a public exchange between two prominent Argentine women, Maria Eugenia Echenique and Josefina Pelliza de Sagasta, which took place in May and June 1876. The exchange began with a brief essay Echenique published in *La Ondina del Plata*, a Buenos Aires women's magazine, in which she lamented the fact that women lacked political rights and access to education, the two things they needed in order to be self-sufficient. Pelliza de Sagasta responded with a sharp rebuke of Echenique's feminist sensibilities, invoking widely held beliefs about women's natural subservience to men.

The exchange between Echenique and Pelliza de Sagasta, a portion of which is presented below<sup>8</sup> reminds us that essentialist arguments about the natural inclinations of a given identity in this era invariably linked a series of overlapping assumptions about both the gender and race of the subject. What was more, the power of these assumptions lay in their capacity to invoke a belief that difference was natural, an argument that was made both by women and men. And yet, the very fact of this exchange should also alert us to the fact that Latin American feminists consistently struggled throughout the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth century for their citizenship rights. Their struggles were not entirely distinct from the struggles for racial equality, and the price paid for their activism was often high. As late as 1924, María Jesús Alvarado Rivera would be exiled from Peru for actively campaigning for women's equality. While it is true that most of the women's political parties and feminine congresses that took place during these decades were middle-class affairs that offered little for poor, working-class women (indeed, middle-class women often viewed poor women with the same sense of superiority and distaste as their male counterparts), they nonetheless represent an important reminder of the struggles Latin Americans from a variety of backgrounds have undertaken to establish their rights as citizens.

Together, the documents offer a limited view of the complex terrain upon which Latin Americans demanded and denied rights in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Latin America. In terms of race, we see notable differences from the United States here, as well as some marked similarities. Race would invariably be used in an effort to limit the rights of non-whites, and yet the indeterminacy of Nina Rodrigues' work—the fact that mulattos could be redeemed—and the continued and active demand for rights on the part of Afro-Cuban veterans remind us that race relations in these societies were in some ways constituted on different grounds than in the United States. Race would never be as universally used as a basis for exclusion in Latin America as it was in the United States, where a certain version of whiteness allowed for no African stain. This in turn produced some phenomena that would have been inconceivable in the United States, including a leading scientist whose racial identity was never clear, and a criminologist who, after visiting the Lucumí ceremonies of an Afro-Cuban friend, decided that blackness was not such a threat, after all.

The same could not be said when it came to gender. Though Cuba was an early adopter of women's rights, granting them control of their property in 1917, and the right to a no-fault divorce in 1918, Latin America lagged behind the United States in granting suffrage to women by several decades. Whether this meant that North American feminism was more dynamic than its Latin American cousin is a matter of some dispute. At the very least, it does seem that the relative size of the middle classes in Latin America and their greater capacity to police certain forms of conservative gender conformity limited the appeal of the radical forms of feminism Echenique advocated until much later in the twentieth century.

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**Document 3.1 Raimundo (Raymundo) Nina Rodrigues, *The Fetishist Animism of the Bahian Blacks (O Animismo Fetichistados Negros Bahianos)* (Excerpt)**

Source: Excerpt from Raimundo (Raymundo) Nina Rodrigues, *O Animismo Fetichistados Negros Bahianos (The Fetishist Animism of the Bahian Blacks)*, published 1896–1900). Translated by Diane Grosklaus Whitty.

**The Fetishist Animism of Bahian Negroes**

Only official science, because of the superficial, dogmatic nature of teaching, could insist in asserting even today that the population of Bahia is by and large a monotheistic Christian one. This assertion must reflect either a systematic disregard for calculating the two-thirds African negroes and mixed-race mestizos that make up the great majority of the population, or a naïveté born of brute ignorance that blindly yields to outward appearances that will prove illusory and misleading upon the most superficial examination.

The prediction that this is not how it should be follows both from an understanding of the mental conditions prerequisite to the adoption of any religious belief and from these inferior races' psychic unfitness for the elevated abstractions of monotheism. But in the case at hand, citing this deduction as proof would of course be to commit a gross *petitio principii*, for here the opposite assertion is intended to do no less than stand as a tacit, formal disapprobation of the inductive conclusion reached by ethnographic researches. And only documented observation as thorough and rigorous as that exacted by the delicate nature of this subject matter should, in the final analysis, speak for or against the soundness and applicability of this principle, or for or against its repudiation.

More than once during my exercise of the teaching profession, the demands of psychological analysis in the field of forensic psychiatry have brought me practical experience with the problems raised by this controversy, where the facts always reveal themselves to be in formal contradiction with the ungrounded assertions of official science. Thus engaged in accurately ascertaining the nature and form of the religious feeling of Bahian negroes, I have endeavored to study the facts with the utmost neutrality and impartiality and have devoted nearly five years of time and effort to attentive observations. Considering the strictly scientific spirit in which these painstaking

investigations were conceived in my quest to solve a serious issue in practical ethnology, any preliminary declaration that they neither had nor have anything in common with controversies that debate "the metaphysics of matter and of the spirit" is hardly warranted.

Within the realm of that which is knowable, religious feeling is a positive psychological condition, which in no way presumes the animosities manifested between deists and atheists.

The persistence of African fetishism as an expression of the religious feeling of Bahian negroes and mixed-race mestizos is a fact that has not been disguised by the outward appearances of their apparently adopted Catholic worship, belied in the form of widespread hybrid associations between this worship and fetishism and also in the genuine practice of African sorcery, which thrives exuberantly and heartily alongside Christian worship there. In Bahia there exist deep-rooted fetishist beliefs and practices, established as ordinarily as those in Africa, neither hidden nor disguised but present in the full light of day; there exists a life that evinces its licitness in the police licenses granted for large annual festivals or *candomblés* and that enjoys the tolerance of public opinion, as reflected in how matter-of-factly the daily press reports on these gatherings, as if they were just another facet of our normal life; there exist practices whose activities reach into far broader realms than those in which they originated, and beliefs that are adopted and followed by the soi-disant civilized classes, in virtue of alliances formed with Catholic worship and the union forged with spiritual practices—that these manifold experiences exist lies within the spirit of the public and is fully known to all.

But observations that aspire to be scientific in nature and in value demand a rigor and precision that precludes simply using as references information which can be greatly adulterated or enlarged upon, even if only unconsciously. This subject does not require only authenticity and precision; it also calls for objective references to specific facts that are at any moment liable to verification and examination by those desiring to challenge them. Without a doubt, there arise all sorts of obstacles and stumbling blocks to a fair and just interpretation of facts of this nature, here more than anywhere. "Even dedicating much time and care to it," says Tylor (E. B. Tylor, *La civilisation primitive*, trans. Mme. Pauline Brunet, Paris, 1876, vol. 1, p. 489).

"It is not always easy to elicit from savages information on their theology. They customarily try to hide from the prying and contemptuous foreigner the details of their worship and all knowledge of their gods, who seem to tremble, like their worshippers, before the white man and his mightier Deity." As to not knowing their language, slavery must exacerbate in the African negro the savage's natural tendency to hide his beliefs.

The conviction that religious conversion is a simple matter of willingness and that nothing could be easier than annulling the negro's beliefs through punishment, to then replace these with the white man's, was shaped so as to satisfy the master's interests and thereby justify, as a veritable meritorious deed, all the violence employed to convert them to the Christian faith. However, the deeper reasons that incited the violence of masters and their agents against the fetishist practices of the negro slave were quite other than catechistic zeal.

In the first place, we have a fear that sorcery would be used in retaliation for the mistreatment and punishment inflicted on the slaves and a superstitious dread of

cabbalistic practices of a mysterious, unknown nature; secondly, the indeed well-founded apprehension that religious practices and festivals would come to hinder the regular course of work and justify idleness; thirdly, the despotic deterrent power wielded by the master, who could not admit that the negro might have any will other than his own—these were the true reasons why *candomblés* were continually disbanded through violence, sanctuaries violated, and fetishes destroyed, even when licenses were granted to negroes so that they might amuse themselves to the monotonous sound of the drum-beat. Even freed, the negro could find no protection or aid from the law so that he might freely express his beliefs during the regime of slavery, because then the mission of the law was to preserve this regime. Under the pretext that *candomblés* were a steady source of conflict and affrays and the site of unbridled debauchery and licentiousness, the police would harshly suppress them and at times would hunt them out in the cities, where, considering their nature and location, they should be more protected from the direct action of slave masters than on sugar plantations.

As an overall consequence, since these negroes have been forced their whole lives to disguise and hide their faith and religious practices, the remembrance of persecutions suffered for their beliefs still persists today and will long persist in their memory, closely tied within their spirits to a fear of confessing and explaining these beliefs. As the elimination of slavery is still quite recent, the greatest part of fetishist priests are old Africans who were all slaves. In addition to these motives, a no less powerful reason for the negro's reserve and mystery is the sorcerer's interest in the enhanced prestige he derives from this secrecy. The faith of believers and the credulity of the superstitious are crudely and gainfully exploited by these sorcerers: divulging their practices would divest them of the prestige of the unknown and would seriously damage the influence they exercise.

Along with these multiple causes contributing to our problem of understanding, we find others involving the problem of interpreting the meaning and form of fetishist practices that have been greatly modified by their environment. Transported to American soil and supplanted by an officially taught Catholicism imposed through the violence of slavery, the African element has been diluted in a large heterogeneous social environment, and the purity of African practices and rituals has necessarily and inevitably vanished, replaced by mongrel practices and beliefs. The only whole, pure thing we should expect to find is the feeling that animates their beliefs, as fetishist when the objects of this belief are rocks, trees, or shells from the seashore as when they are the many Catholic saints.

In examining and analyzing this feeling as it presents itself and lives on in the negroes who have become part of the Brazilian population and as it broadly manifests itself in all aspects of our private and public lives, we have set ourselves the task of this study, which intends to deduce therefrom sociological laws and principles that generally go unnoticed or ignored. The Portuguese language that everyone speaks today and the medical profession that I practice have been of equal assistance to me in the accomplishment of this task. The latter has served me twofold, inspiring and strengthening my innermost confidence as a general practitioner, affording a multitude of observations, and creating opportunities to examine these freely.

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This is my objective, less than uncovering the African phylogenesis of our negro fetishism and asking how purely these imported religious practices and beliefs have been preserved.

In the descriptions that follow—which are the premises grounding my final conclusions—an obligation to show that African fetishism prevails in Bahia, that it is the authentic manifestation of the religious feeling of the negroes and vast majority of mestizos here, and that it is not just some chance occurrence coming from this or that sporadic society of superstitious negroes or impostors obliges me to delve into minute details and particulars that under other circumstances could very well be omitted for the sake of clarity and succinctness.

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**Document 3.2 Political Program of the *Partido Independiente de Color*, 1908**

Source: Aviva Chomsky, translator, "The Independent Party of Color, El Partido Independiente de Color," in *The Cuba Reader: History, Culture, Politics*, eds. Aviva Chomsky, Barry Carr, and Pamela Smorkaloff, pp. 163–164. © 2003 Duke University Press. Republished by permission of the copyright holder.

The "Independent Association of Color" hereby constitutes itself as a national organization in the entire territory of the Republic. We seek to maintain a balance among all Cuban interests, spread love for the Fatherland, develop cordial relations and interest everybody in the conservation of Cuban nationality, allowing everybody born in this land to participate equally in public administration.

Our motto is an egalitarian, sovereign, and independent republic, without racial divisions or social antagonisms. All Cubans who are worthy should be able to be named to the diplomatic corps, and, as a matter of important and urgent necessity, citizens of the race of color should be named, so that the republic can be represented in all its hues.

We believe that all court trials that take place in the Republic should be trials by jury, and that the duty of serving on the jury should be mandatory and free.

We call for

The abolition of the death penalty, and for the creation of penitentiaries that fulfill the needs of modern civilization.

The creation of correctional School-ships (Barcos-escuelas) for youthful offenders who, according to the law, cannot suffer greater penalties.

Free and compulsory education for children from ages six to fourteen.

The creation of polytechnic (vocational) schools in each of the six provinces, free and compulsory for adults, to be considered as the second stage of compulsory education, and consisting Arts and Trades.

Official, national, and free university education available to all.

The regulation of private and official education, under the auspices of the state, so that the education of all Cubans will be uniform.

The creation of a Naval and Military Academy.

Free and faithful (leal) admission into military, administrative, government, and judicial services of citizens of color, so that all of the races can be represented in the service of the state.

Immigration should be free for all races, without giving preference to any. The free entrance of all individuals who, within sanitary prescriptions, come in good faith to contribute to the development of the public good.

The repatriation, at public expense, of all Cubans from foreign shores who want to return to their native land but lack the necessary resources.

The creation of a Law to guarantee that in employment in all public enterprises, in Cuba and abroad, Cubans will be given preference to foreigners, until the latter are naturalized, and preventing new enterprises from being established in other countries.

We will work to make the eight-hour day the norm in all of the territory of the republic. The creation of a Labor Tribunal to regulate any differences that arise between capital and labor.

The promulgation of a law prohibiting the immigration of minors, and of women, except when they are accompanied by their families.

The distribution of plots of land from State reserves, or from lands acquired by the state for this purpose, among veterans of the War of Independence who lack resources and who wish to devote themselves to agriculture, giving preference to those who are not suited for public office.

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### Document 3.3 *Manifiesto, "Santa Rita de Casia," y "San Lázaro," Sociedad de Protección Mutua, Canto y Baile*

Source: Instituto de Literatura y Lingüística, Havana, Cuba. Translated by Patricia Rosas.

#### **We Are Religious People, Not Atheists**

This manifesto is directed to the people who upon the death of our Director, señor Silvestre Erise, knew how to fulfill like true Christians the high mission of respect and consideration for the dead, as the lifeless material must not be profaned by anyone, much less by people educated and intellectual in matters of human understanding.

To all those who felt in their hearts the nostalgia of others' grief in the sad moments experienced by the family, friends, and members of the Society, the Board of Directors wishes to thank them. Together we felt the death of our Director of the "Santa Rita de Casia" and "San Lázaro" Society, the man who founded it in 1902 in the Barrio del Cerro.

We Christians who belong to the aforementioned society pray to the Supreme Being for the happiness and consolation of those people who, in the columns of certain newspapers, like *La Marina*, profaned the name of the person who in life was called SILVESTRE ERISE and who, we have heard, on various occasions donated 300 pesos to help build the Reina Mercedes Hospital and 500 more for a Cuban who is living in Spain.

As mourners and aggrieved friends, who loved the person who is gone, we would like to say something to those people who, despite their culture and social contacts, lack respect for those who mourn the death of a beloved person. If we say nothing, it is to show that the sentiments of our unwarranted enemies are not equal to those of the mourners and friends of the deceased.

We say this because, as true Christians, we beseech in our prayers to Providence for all kinds of happiness and comforts for those whose bodies, like that of Señor Erice [sic], will always have to cover the earth with its mantle of rocks and multi-colored roots. Like the social laws of nature, this makes us all equals.

We all know that to be born means to die and that we must comply with the immutable laws of Nature. For this reason, despite the human species feeling the great weight of death, the end and the beginning of social life in Nature teaches us to know what we are and for what purpose we serve here on earth: to be born, to die, and to die to be born.

All human beings, given that they are born, must necessarily take care of themselves, and for that, it is clear, one must assimilate whatever is appropriate for life and for the development of a person's being, whatever is befitting for the self-same transmission of life. This is necessary so that the species can reproduce with all of the conditions of a healthy and strong constitution, so that development may be what it ought to be, within biological laws.

Death is Nature's justice. Before it, we are all equals: scholar, philosopher, oppressor, tyrant, the proud, the haughty, the humble, rich and poor, the ignorant, ruler and the ruled, oppressor and the oppressed, the fulfilled person and the beggar, the civilized and the uncivilized, all on the earth who hate each other because of our human preoccupations. As death is Nature's justice, thus all we are is dust, smoke, and ashes here on this earth.

After all that has come before, we move on to the duty that our Director left us before his passing, as well as encountering impassioned love for our fellow men, the bond felt by those who loved him. Thus, through the unity of those who profess the Lucumí religious doctrine, and with the justice of the Republic's laws, we shall be able to maintain the prestige and equilibrium of the Society, the object of his desires, sacrifices, and sorrows until the last moments of his Christian life, as a man faithful to God and fulfilling his duties as head of the family.

Nothing is so Christian, noble, and sacred in the conscience of social beings as fulfilling the request of a person on his deathbed. For this reason, we are inviting those people who are known in the province of Havana and who wish to formally join this Society for Mutual Protection, Song, and Dance.

We let it be known that the fee for joining is one peso; 20 centavos, weekly and 80 centavos, monthly. The allowance for ill members who are bedridden is one official peso coin. In the case of death, to defray the costs of the burial, 25 pesos in the same coin will be delivered to the family member closest to the deceased who had helped that person until the final moments of life.

The "Santa Rita de Casia" and "San Lázaro" Society does not require a member to have a medical certificate, since the person covered by the treasury must present himself in good health before the President, Secretary, Treasurer, and Director.

We also wish to announce that the Reformed Regulation of the aforementioned Society does not recognize chronic illnesses because it is a society of a distinct nature from the Socorros Mutuos (Mutual Aid Societies), which requires a medical certificate because members declared as suffering from a chronic disease are separated from other members. For that reason, we call attention to those of us who profess the African religion Lucumí, and to whom we are able to say that with the succor they give us during Sunday services, it is possible to pay the rental of a house and other expenses of the Society.

We also let it be known that the weekly and monthly membership fee is destined for cases of members' illnesses or death. For that reason, the Treasurer cannot hold an amount greater than 20 pesos, and the remainder of the money with the President's help will be deposited in the his bank in the capital.

Now, since those of us who profess the African religious doctrine of Lucumí have clearly taken into account what is mutual protection for the cases of illness and death, we are certain that we have complied with these words of Jesus: "love one another"—and to that we add—for our Father who art in Heaven, that he protect the collective unit of the oppressed and the abused, for those who as human beings are like us, of flesh and blood.

After all that has been explained in this manifesto, as religious people and not atheists, it remains for us to say to the members and protectors of the Society that on Sunday, October 17, we will begin our Sunday services with the recognition of the municipal mayor and the chief of police, señor Placido Hernandez, who respectful of the laws of the Republic faithfully fulfills what his superiors order him to do. And as the chief of police is the guarantor of public order in the Barrio del Cerro, the board of directors of the aforementioned Society respectfully salute him, señor Placido Hernandez, the officials, and other subordinates from the 11th police station.

For the Board of Directors, Fernando Guerra, President  
Havana, September 30, 1915

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#### Document 3.4 "Brushstrokes" by Maria Eugenia Echenique (May 7, 1876)

Source: Translated by the Palouse Translation Project. "The Emancipation of Women: Argentina 1876." *Journal of Women's History* 7:3 (Fall 1995), 103–104. © 1995 *Journal of Women's History*. Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.

I have held my pen in hand for five minutes, and I still do not know what I am going to write about. There are so many ideas and feelings overwhelming me at this moment that I remain in doubt about the choice of a specific point to serve as the topic for an article.

I could easily allow myself a pleasant moment of innocent entertainment that still would have a certain utility—surrendering to purely imaginative games, tracing with my pen beautiful images capable of stirring sweet emotions in the heart without compromising men's morality or dignity, writing a dream, a meditation, or a fantasy drawing all the soul's sensations into a world of poetry—that would satisfy the need that my spirit feels to communicate and open the gate to vast fields of thought.

But to write a fantasy when the women of this century have need of our meager education and of resources useful to them in the difficult circumstances through which they are passing; when they have need of the cooperation of Argentine women writers in the great work of their regeneration, begun recently in this part of America, that brings to each of us serious obligations to fulfill in the social and moral order; to waste time in futile games when the majority of our sex cries forgotten on the path of ignorance, being toys of charlatanism, waiting for a protecting hand to come take them out of inaction and put them in their rightful position—that would be an unpardonable failure that would injure the delicate susceptibility of our sensitive and thoughtful women.

Our heart rebels against the ideas of spirituality, sensibility, and poetry that, as cultivated by women, have callously contributed until now to women's delay on the road of progress and the improvement of their condition. That remains from those ancient times when women were slaves under the power of absolute masters, subject to the whims and rule of the "heads" of families or of tyrannical husbands, when women had no aspirations nor anything to think about, when they felt a profound emptiness in their hearts that they needed to fill with beautiful daydreams and gilded illusions; the reduced sphere of action to which they had been relegated and the absolute ostracism which surrounded them wherever they were, developed their melancholy feelings to a high degree, making it necessary for them to seek solace for their moments of bitterness and disillusionment.

The ideas of freedom born in this century, by extending the circle of women's prerogatives, have infused them with new aspirations and unveiled great things to think about and occupy themselves with. The women of today are not the women of the past. The change that has taken place within them in these recent times is profound. Instead of poetry, today they need philosophy, practical philosophy that better idealizes life when it saves women from the critical circumstances of a dark and difficult existence, responding to the great interests of humanity.

How do women look when they spend days and years crying at the least disappointments and deceptions of life, exaggerating to themselves the pain of their existence, forging a world of sadness, at each step finding ominous specters in everything, living solely on illusions, feigning lovely ideals that vanish like smoke, in contrast with men who laugh at every-thing, who make a joke of themselves, who only think of filling their pockets and satisfying their own desires, who if they encounter an obstacle to the pursuit of any goal they set, become angry and trample over everything, men who live impatient to climb mountains of glory in the progress of science in all its manifestations?

In the materialistic century in which we live, it is necessary to make women a bit philosophical if we do not want them to become lost in their endeavors. Less sensibility and more reflection! With sentimentalism, women will not satisfy their needs in a century in which gold and the prosaic shine of possessions are king.

In the press, our mission is as interpreters of their affections and aspirations, a sacred mission from which we cannot exempt ourselves without compromising our own interests. To smooth the road of civilization and of culture, removing the barriers that oppose the achievement of the great thoughts and generous desires that stir women's hearts in the present century, contributing with our pen to the realization of their most beautiful hopes; to teach them to overcome the prejudices that diminish

their rights, opposing the torrent of disorderly passions that destroy them; to show them the path that leads to happiness in the attainment of sacred duties and the cultivation of elevated passions, infusing in them love of the arts and sciences, of reading and working; in short, to teach them the way to take care of their physical needs more skillfully according to their social standing—such is the vast circle of obligations that our position as writers undertakes in a country where the regeneration of women has begun in such a splendid and brilliant way.

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**Document 3.5 “Women: Dedicated to Miss Maria Eugenia Echenique” by Judith [Josefina Pelliza de Sagasta] (June 4, 1876)**

Source: Translated by the Palouse Translation Project. “The Emancipation of Women: Argentina 1876.” *Journal of Women’s History* 7:3 (Fall 1995), 105–107. © 1995 *Journal of Women’s History*. Reprinted with permission of Johns Hopkins University Press.

You discuss improving the present condition of women, but in this question of such interest and such serious consequences for South American women, we encounter very grave drawbacks. The emancipation of women, treated with enthusiasm by Argentine and even Peruvian authors, is an unattainable feat in our humble opinion and, moreover, harmful if it were to be attained. Entirely free women, with as much independence as men, would lose their greatest charms and the poetic prestige of their weakness: the prestige which forms the most noble attribute of their sex, the prestige that later, when women are mothers, doubly beautifies them and places them on the sacred throne of the home, where women best belong.

Women, in our opinion, should never even in thought surpass the limits that God when making them—their souls with the softest breaths of divine light and their bodies with the purest of His celestial conceptions—gave them as their path on earth: He pointed out their mission, and gave them a physical and moral constitution different from men and in accordance with the sorrows and sufferings of their destiny as daughters, wives, and mothers. Woman, one celebrated writer has said, “is the poetry of God, and man is His prose.” There only remains to admire women’s delicate shapes (with some exceptions), their souls susceptible to tender emotions, always gentle and loving, their thoughts, in short their physical beauty, in order to exclaim: the destiny of women is not, as has mistakenly been said, equal to the destiny of men, because the former are weak and tender in their spirit and their bodies cannot endure the difficult hardships to which men are subjected; their dignity would be diminished if they were to attempt to liberate themselves from those sweet attributes of their nature, from those bonds that the propagandist writers of emancipation have been calling guardianship, without realizing that it is precisely that guardianship which makes women more beautiful, that elevates them to their true pedestal without aspirations of glory or applause, that binds them to their husbands, that binds them to the home, and that makes them into the guardian angel of the family. She is a slave! you emancipated women will exclaim—and I in turn will reply to you: not a slave but a companion, man’s

other half, slave perhaps to her children, but how seductive and poetic is her beautiful sacrifice. Blessed be the woman who is a mother!

Woman is born to love, to be protected by the generous heart of man, guided by him and embodied in that powerful and noble soul like the purest breath of celestial light; sheltered by man, defended by him, always joined to him, and supported by him like the tender shoots that cling to the shade and protection of the stake that sustains them if they waver, that helps and reinforces them if they wilt, and that always defends them with solicitous care.

But let us hear the authoritative word of the sublime Spanish author Maria del Pilar Sinués de Marco. She says: "There will never be a husband for an emancipated woman, whether her emancipation be a dream of sick fantasies or whether it be imposed upon society as law! What man would want to see his daughters educated to be teachers and his sons for uselessness? What man would thus decline the sacred rights of his nature? What honorable occupation would remain to men in their homes, if the wives managed the businesses and disposed of the assets? Bah! Bah! Is this nothing more than abolishing marriage? Thus emancipation is a monstrosity which few women would be party to; homes would remain without warmth and without light because there would be no wives nor mothers.

"Love would remain for women. Horror! What is love when it is not restrained and beautified by duty? To pretend that men only speak to the senses and never to the heart?

"No, no, God made man the natural head of the family. Work! He said to Adam. Love, He said to women in general through Eve. Console man! Make my punishment more bearable! Follow him wherever he goes! With science the heart petrifies and one lives without love! . . . Without love! the redemption, consolation, strength, and heaven on earth for women!"

So says the inspired author of *Angel of the House*. We will add: good women are virtuous, talented, with legitimate aspirations, with freedom of beliefs, educated, with mutual rights between them and their companions for life, energetic, capable of sacrifice, capable of the martyrdom of heroism, well-read, a writer, progressive, an initiator—in short everything but emancipated, less free in independence and rights than men.

Women should be educated; give them a solid education, based on wholesome principles, cemented with moral and sensible beliefs; they should have a general knowledge of everything that awakens ingenuity and determines ideas, but not for them are the calculation and egotism with which they instruct English women, not for them the ridiculous ideas of North American women who pretend in their pride to be equal to men, to be legislators and obtain a seat in Congress or be university professors, as if it were not enough to be a mother, a wife, a housewife, as if her rights as a woman were not enough to be happy and to make others happy, as if it were not enough to carry out her sacred mission on earth: educating her family, cultivating the tender hearts of her children making them useful citizens, laborers of intelligence and progress, with her words and acts; cultivating love in her children and the sentiments that most enhance women: virtue, modesty and humility. Girls, women someday, be tender and loving wives, able to work for the happiness of your life's partner instead of bringing about his disgrace with dreams and aspirations

beyond your sphere. We concede to women, if their ability is sufficient, that they be well-read; the woman who writes, when that woman is virtuous, is always useful to society; there are women, wives and mothers, who without forgetting their responsibilities are writers and are the glory of their sex. One only has to look to Europe to see distinguished against a backdrop of light the most passionate and gentle of the poetesses of our era and the most tender and kind of wives—the beautiful Staël, the divine author of *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Madame Gay, her daughter Emilia de Girardin.

I will conclude this already too-long article, beseeching Argentine women writers, and those who are not, to look over the pages of Severo Catalina's *Woman* and Marco's *Angel of the House*, and we are sure that your ideas will take another turn. Above all else, read *Love* by Mr. de Michelet. Ah! Then see if you have adopted with your thought and with your pen the emancipation of women; there woman as a divine work of idealism and perfection is lover and beloved, esteemed by men and respected by them, in short she is the woman of our dreams—pure, delicate, modest woman; the woman that only the great French writer's pen dipped in glory could draw with tight and beauty, with tints and perfumes of inexpressible color and perfect naturalness; look there, in that chaste and sublime poem of *Love* for the real and most beautiful type of women, true daughters, wives, and mothers, and you will find them profiled with fragrance, with a magnetic attraction that will make you exclaim- blessed be the woman under the guardianship of man. And in concluding my article I will say to you: love women in their true form, exalted in their homes, absolute queens of the hearts of men, exercising their unequaled mastery, on their immovable diamond thrones, strong, colossal in the midst of their weakness.

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## At A Glance: People

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- B.1) Graph: The Indigenous Population of the Americas, 1500–2003
- B.2) Map: The movement of African Slaves to the Americas, from the 1400s to the 1860s
- B.3) Table: Breakdown of the Population of Latin America by the Categories White, Black/Mulatto, Amerindian, and Mestizo
- B.4) Table and Graph: Population Growth in Latin America Since 1750
- B.5) Table: Afro-descendent and Indigenous Population in Contemporary Latin America
- B.6) Table: Male vs. Female Lifespans by Country
- B.7) Graph: Proportion of Women Who Completed Their Primary Schooling, by Cohort Group (19 countries)
- B.8) Map: Poverty Rates in Contemporary Latin America

**B**elow we consider several of the important demographic trends that have shaped Latin America since the early nineteenth century. We begin with three figures that are rooted in the colonial past. **Figure B.1** measures the indigenous population of the region from the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries. **Figure B.2** considers the impact of the importation of eleven million African slaves on Latin America. **Figure B.3** surveys the complex ethnic mix that characterized the colonies at Independence, and represents an effort to consider miscegenation over time. Obsessed with racial difference, the Spanish colonial state separated the *casta* (mixed race) population into more than fifteen different categories. This obsession took a different form in Latin America than in Anglo America. Whereas in the North mixed origins were rarely acknowledged (consider the “One Drop Rule” in the U.S.), in Latin America and the Caribbean *mulatto* was generally recognized, and later celebrated in anti-imperial nationalist discourses during the twentieth century.


**Figure B.4** measures population growth in Latin America since 1750. One can see that the rate of population growth increased dramatically during the twentieth century, a rate likely attributable to better nutrition and health care. This rate has slowed considerably in recent years, and is expected to be modest during the first half of the twenty-first century.

The following figures delve deeper into these numbers, examining the contemporary ethnic breakdown of the region and the different experiences of men and women. **Figure B.5** is the result of research that endeavors to use recent census data to track the indigenous and African origin populations of Latin America. In one example of the diversity of racial typologies in the region, the researchers used a variety of labels to assess the Afro-descended population, including black, mulatto, *garifuna*, *criollo*, *indio* (in the case of the Dominican Republic), and *moreno*. In sum, these figures show the complex ways that indigenous and Afro-descended populations are spread across the region, with little presence in some countries and constituting majorities in others.

**Figure B.6** considers life expectancies, separated out by men and women, between 1950 and 2004. During this period the mean life expectancy for men in the region rose by twenty years and for women it rose by twenty-two years. Latin America today exceeds global averages in this measure, but still lags behind the wealthiest nations. Coupled with falling fertility rates, these figures demonstrate the importance of improved social and health services across the region during the latter half of the twentieth century, along with general improvements in the standard of living. What they do not allow us to see is the way that growing inequality figures into these statistics. Although the average figures are quite impressive, they hide the fact that some are doing far better than the average, and that a significant number are lagging quite a bit behind.

**Figure B.7** offers an opportunity to break down these numbers according to percentage of women in any given country who have completed a primary education. This measure tends to be a fairly robust indicator of social and economic well-being, as well as a strong indicator of the state of gender relations in any given setting. This graph shows unprecedented growth in educational levels for women in Latin America since the start of the twentieth century. Women still lag behind men in several countries, but elsewhere seem to have caught up. In Argentina and Uruguay, where educational levels were higher than in much of the region at the beginning of the century, nearly all women now receive a primary education. Most Central American countries have seen steady gains, but still lag behind other countries. Others, like Mexico and Peru, have outperformed the region as a whole relative to where they began.

**Figure B.8** is a map of poverty in contemporary Latin America. This graphic offers us an opportunity to interrogate the previous measures of social well-being. Poverty has been declining in aggregate terms across the region in recent years, although the picture gets more complex when broken down by country. And as is the case in Mexico, even within individual countries we see regions with very low incidences of poverty, and other regions where poverty rates remain quite high. If mapped onto these indicators of poverty, the statistics presented in Figures B.6 and B.7 would look somewhat different. The measures of education, gender equality, and life expectancy in more prosperous regions would approximate what we find in the Global North, whereas in regions characterized by extreme poverty and inequality the results would be quite different.



**Figure B.1** Graph: The Indigenous population of the Americas, 1500–2003.

Source: Reprinted from Raul A. Montenegro and Carolyn Stephens, "Indigenous health in Latin America and the Caribbean," *The Lancet*, Volume 367, Issue 9525, Pages 1859–1869, with permission from Elsevier.




Figure B.2 Map: The movement of African Slaves to the America, from the 1400s to the 1860s.


**Table B.3** Breakdown of the Population of Latin America by the categories White, Black/Mulatto, Amerindian, and Mestizo, from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries.

Year	White	Black	Amerindian	Mestizo	Total
1650	138	67	12,000	670	12,875
Percentages	1.1%	0.5%	93.2%	5.2%	100%
1825	4,350	4,100	8,000	6,200	22,650
Percentages	19.2%	18.1%	35.3%	27.3%	100%
1950	72,000	13,729	14,000	61,000	160,729
Percentages	44.8%	8.5%	8.7%	37.9%	100%
1980	150,000	27,000	30,000	140,000	347,000
Percentages	43.2%	7.7%	8.6%	40.3%	100%
2000	181,296	119,055	46,434	152,380	502,784
Percentages	36.1%	23.6%	9.2%	30.3%	100%

Source: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White\\_Latin\\_American](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/White_Latin_American); taken from *The Cry of My People. Out of Captivity in Latin America*, written by Esther and Mortimer Arias. New York: Friendship Press, 1980. Pages 17 and 18. Data belonging to the year 2000 are taken from Francisco Lizcano Fernández (May–August 2005). “Composición Étnica de las Tres Áreas Culturales del Continente Americano al Comienzo del Siglo XXI”. *Convergencia* (in Spanish) (Mexico: Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México, Centro de Investigación en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades) 38: 185–232; table on p. 218.

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1750	16,000,000
1800	24,000,000
1850	38,000,000
1900	74,000,000
1950	<del>167,368,000</del>
2000	<del>521,429,000</del>
2050	750,956,000



**Figure B.4** Table and Graph: Population Growth in Latin America Since 1750

Countries	Year	Afrodescendant Population	Percentage	Year	Indigenous Population	Percentage	Total National Population
Argentina <sup>1</sup>	2010	150	0.4	2010	955	2.4	40,117
Bolivia <sup>2</sup>	2012	24	0.2	2012	4,068	40.6	10,027
<b>Brazil<sup>3</sup></b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>97,083</b>	<b>50.9</b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>897</b>	<b>0.5</b>	<b>190,733</b>
Chile <sup>4</sup>	2012	97	0.6 <sup>5</sup>	2012	1,700	10.3	16,636
<b>Colombia<sup>6</sup></b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>4,274</b>	<b>10.5</b>	<b>2005</b>	<b>1,393</b>	<b>3.4</b>	<b>41,468</b>
Costa Rica <sup>7</sup>	2011	334	7.8	2011	104	2.4	4,302
Cuba <sup>8</sup>	2012	3,885	34.8 <sup>9</sup>	2012	–	–	11,163
Dominican Republic <sup>10</sup>	2010	A) 2,267 B) 8,980	A) 24.0 B) 89.0 <sup>11</sup>	2010	2267	24	9,445
Ecuador <sup>12</sup>	2010	1,043	7.2	2010	1,014	7.0	14,484
El Salvador <sup>13</sup>	2007	7	0.13	2007	13	0.23	5,744
Guatemala <sup>14</sup>	2011	5	0.0	2011	4,428 <sup>15</sup>	30.0	14,713
Honduras <sup>16</sup>	2011	59	1.0	2001	428	7.0	8,448
<b>Mexico<sup>17</sup></b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>2,366</b>	<b>2.2<sup>18</sup></b>	<b>2010</b>	<b>11,133</b>	<b>9.9</b>	<b>112,337</b>
Nicaragua <sup>19</sup>	2005	23	0.4	2005	444	8.6	5,142
Panama <sup>20</sup>	2010	313	9.2	2010	418	12.3	3,454
Paraguay <sup>21</sup>	2012	234	3.5 <sup>22</sup>	2012	116	1.7	6,673
<b>Peru<sup>23</sup></b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>411</b>	<b>1.5<sup>24</sup></b>	<b>2007</b>	<b>7,600</b>	<b>27.0<sup>25</sup></b>	<b>27,412</b>
Uruguay <sup>26</sup>	2011	255	7.8	2011	159	4.8	3,286
Venezuela <sup>27</sup>	2011	A) 953 B) 14,534	A) 3.5 B) 53.4 <sup>28</sup>	2011	953 <sup>29</sup>	3.5	27,228
<b>TOTAL</b>		A) 112,035 B) 133,027	A) 20.2 B) 24.0		34,317	6.2	554

**Figure B.5** Table: Afro-descendant and Indigenous population in contemporary Latin America

Source: Edward Telles, *Pigmentocracies: Ethnicity, Race, and Color in Latin America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014). Reprinted by permission of the publisher. www.uncpress.unc.edu.

*Notes:*

<sup>1</sup> Argentine Census 2010, INDEC, [http://www.censo2010.indec.gov.ar/archivos/centso2010\\_tomo1.pdf](http://www.censo2010.indec.gov.ar/archivos/centso2010_tomo1.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Bolivian census 2012, INE, <http://www.ine.gob.bo:8081/centso2012/default.aspx>. The Bolivian census counts only those 15 and older for indigenous and Afrodescendant affiliation. As such, the projected total number of indigenous and Afro-Colombians was calculated by multiplying the percentage of 15+ year olds by the total number of Bolivians.

<sup>3</sup> Brazilian Census 2010, IBGE.

<sup>4</sup> "Chile's "Official" Indigenous Population More than Doubles with New Census Results," Indigenous News, <http://indigenousnews.org/2013/04/08/chiles-official-indigenous-population-more-than-doubles-with-new-census-results/>. Upon time of research, the census data was undergoing an internal audit, and as such, was unavailable to corroborate the report of this news source.

<sup>5</sup> 2010 America's Barometer (LAPOP)

<sup>6</sup> *La visibilización estadística de los grupos étnicos colombianos* (2005), DANE, [http://www.dane.gov.co/files/centso2005/etnia/sys/visibilidad\\_estadistica\\_etnicos.pdf](http://www.dane.gov.co/files/centso2005/etnia/sys/visibilidad_estadistica_etnicos.pdf).

<sup>7</sup> Costa Rican Census 2011, INEC, <http://www.inec.go.cr/Web/Home/GeneradorPagina.aspx;2010> America's Barometer (LAPOP). Figure includes those who reported as "Indio."

<sup>8</sup> Cuban Census 2012, ONE, <http://www.one.cu/cifraspreliminares2012.htm>.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, <http://www.one.cu/publicaciones/08informacion/panorama2012/10%20Demograficos.pdf>; the 2012 census showed that 10.4% of Cubans reported as "negro" and 24.8% reported as "mulatto."

<sup>10</sup> Dominican Census 2010, ONE, <http://censo2010.one.gob.do/index.php>.

AuQ1

AuQ2

<sup>11</sup> 2010 America's Barometer (LAPOP). Estimate A includes only persons identifying as negro, mulatto or Afro-Dominican. Estimate B also includes persons identifying as Indio.

<sup>12</sup> Ecuadorian Census 2010, INEC, [http://www.elcomercio.com/sociedad/resultados-censo-Censo\\_de\\_Poblacion\\_y\\_Vivienda-INEC\\_ECMFIL20110905\\_0005.pdf](http://www.elcomercio.com/sociedad/resultados-censo-Censo_de_Poblacion_y_Vivienda-INEC_ECMFIL20110905_0005.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> Salvadoran Census 2007, DIGESTYC, <http://www.digestyc.gob.sv/servers/redatam/htdocs/CPV2007S/index.html>.

<sup>14</sup> Guatemalan Census 2011, INE, <http://www.ine.gob.gt/np/poblacion/index.htm>.

<sup>15</sup> Includes Maya and Xinka.

<sup>16</sup> Honduran census bureau site (<http://www.ine.gob.hn/drupal/>) has crashed, so I was unable to get updated information from that source.

<sup>17</sup> Bases de datos por municipio 2010, CDI (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo de los Pueblos Indígenas), [http://www.cdi.gob.mx/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=1327:cedulas-de-informacion-basica-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-de-mexico-&catid=38:indicadores-y-estadisticas&Itemid=54](http://www.cdi.gob.mx/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1327:cedulas-de-informacion-basica-de-los-pueblos-indigenas-de-mexico-&catid=38:indicadores-y-estadisticas&Itemid=54).

<sup>18</sup> 2010 America's Barometer (LAPOP).

<sup>19</sup> Census 2005, INIDE, <http://www.inide.gob.ni/censos2005/ResumenCensal/Resumen2.pdf>.

<sup>20</sup> Panamanian Census 2010, <http://estadisticas.contraloria.gob.pa/Resultados2010/>.

<sup>21</sup> Paraguayan Census 2012, DGEEC, <http://www.dgeec.gov.py/index.php>.

<sup>22</sup> Inter-American Development Bank projection, <http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/gender-indigenous-peoples-and-african-descendants/percentage-of-afro-descendants-in-latin-america,6446.html>.

<sup>23</sup> Peruvian Census 2007, INEI, <http://www.inei.gob.pe/>.

AuQ3

<sup>24</sup> ENCO 2006, INEI.

<sup>25</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> Uruguayan Census 2011, INE, <http://www.ine.gub.uy/censos2011/index.html>.

<sup>27</sup> Venezuelan Census 2011, INE, <http://www.redatam.ine.gob.ve/redatam/index.html>. Estimate A includes only persons identifying as negro, mulatto, or Afro-Venezuelan. Estimate B also includes persons identifying as moreno.


<sup>28</sup> The figure counts those who self-identified as "negro," "afrodescendiente," as well as those who identify as "moreno."

<sup>29</sup> Primeros Resultados Censo Nacional 2011: Población Indígena De Venezuela, Ine, <http://www.ine.gov.ve/documentos/Demografia/CensodePoblacionyVivienda/pdf/PrimerosResultadosIndigena.pdf>.

**Table B.6** Male Vs. Female Lifespans by Country, 1950–2004

Countries	Men		Women		Total		Gains between 1950–1954 and 2000–2004		
	1950–1954	2000–2004	1950–1954	2000–2004	1950–1954	2000–2004	Men	Women	Total
<b>Mesoamerica</b>	47.8	71.3	51.0	76.5	49.3	73.8	23.5	25.5	34.5
Costa Rica	56.0	75.8	58.6	80.6	57.3	78.1	19.8	22.0	20.9
Guatemala	41.8	65.5	42.3	72.5	42.0	68.9	23.7	30.2	36.9
Honduras	40.5	68.6	43.2	73.4	41.8	71.0	28.1	30.2	39.2
Mexico	43.9	72.4	52.5	77.4	50.7	74.8	23.5	34.3	24.1
Nicaragua	40.9	67.2	43.7	71.9	42.3	69.5	26.3	28.2	27.2
Panama	54.4	72.3	56.2	77.4	55.3	74.7	17.9	21.1	19.5
El Salvador	44.1	67.7	46.5	73.7	45.3	70.6	23.6	27.3	25.4
<b>Caribbean</b>	51.8	68.3	54.8	72.8	53.3	70.5	16.5	18.0	17.2
<b>Netherlands</b>									
Antilles	59.1	73.3	61.6	79.2	60.5	76.3	14.2	17.6	15.9
Bahamas	58.3	63.9	61.2	70.3	59.8	67.1	5.6	9.1	7.3
Barbados	55.0	74.5	59.5	79.5	57.2	77.2	19.5	20.0	20.0
Belize	57.1	69.9	58.3	73.0	57.7	71.4	12.9	14.7	13.7
Cuba	57.8	75.3	61.3	79.1	59.5	77.1	17.5	17.8	17.7
Dominica	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Grenada	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Guadeloupe	55.0	74.8	58.1	81.7	56.5	78.3	19.8	23.6	21.8
Guyana	50.8	60.1	53.9	66.3	52.3	63.2	9.3	12.4	10.9
French Guiana	50.3	72.5	56.9	78.3	53.3	75.1	22.2	21.4	21.9
Haiti	36.3	57.8	38.9	60.7	37.6	59.2	21.5	21.9	21.7
Jamaica	56.9	73.7	60.2	77.3	58.5	75.7	16.8	17.6	17.2
Martinique	55.0	75.8	58.1	82.3	56.6	79.1	20.8	24.2	22.6
Puerto Rico	62.7	71.2	66.0	80.1	64.3	75.6	8.5	14.1	11.3
Dominican Rep.	44.7	67.8	47.3	72.4	46.0	70.1	23.1	25.1	24.1
Saint Lucia	52.7	70.8	55.3	74.1	54.1	72.5	18.1	18.8	18.4
Suriname	54.4	68.5	57.7	73.7	56.0	71.1	14.1	16.0	15.1
Trinidad and Tobago	58.2	68.4	59.9	74.4	59.1	71.3	10.2	14.5	12.2
<b>Andean Countries</b>	47.2	68.6	50.2	74.3	48.7	71.4	21.4	24.1	22.7
Bolivia	38.5	61.8	42.5	66.0	40.4	63.8	23.3	23.5	23.4
Colombia	49.0	69.2	52.3	75.3	50.6	72.2	20.2	23.0	21.6
Ecuador	47.1	71.3	49.6	77.3	48.4	74.2	24.3	27.6	25.8
Peru	42.9	67.3	45.0	72.4	43.9	69.8	24.5	27.4	25.9
Venezuela	53.8	69.9	56.6	75.8	55.2	72.8	16.1	19.2	17.6
<b>Southern Cone and Brazil</b>	52.5	68.4	56.3	75.8	54.3	72.0	15.9	19.5	17.7
Argentina	60.4	70.6	65.1	78.1	62.7	74.3	10.2	13.0	11.6
Brazil	49.3	67.3	52.8	74.9	51.0	71.0	18.0	22.2	20.0
Chile	52.9	74.8	56.8	80.8	54.8	77.7	21.9	24.0	22.9
Paraguay	60.7	68.6	64.7	73.1	62.6	70.8	7.9	8.5	8.2
Uruguay	63.3	71.6	69.4	78.9	66.3	75.2	8.3	9.5	8.9
<b>Total</b>	49.7	68.3	53.1	74.9	51.4	71.5	18.6	21.8	20.1

Sources: estimates by CELADE ([http://www.eclac.cl/celade/proyecciones/basedatos\\_BD.htm](http://www.eclac.cl/celade/proyecciones/basedatos_BD.htm)); United Nations (2005) for data on English-speaking Caribbean count



**Figure B.7** Graph: Proportion of Women Who Completed Their Primary Schooling by Cohort Group (19 countries)

Source: José Miguel Guzman et al., "The Demography of Latin America and the Caribbean since 1950." Population vol. 61, no. 5/6 (2006), Figure 18 (data in table A.33). Reprinted courtesy of I.N.E.D. (Institut national d'études démographiques), Paris.



**Figure B.8** Map: Poverty Rates in Contemporary Latin America



1838	May 24, 1844	1859	1861	1864	1868–1874
First railroads built in Latin America in Cuba	Samuel Morse transmits first message by telegraph	Street cars introduced in Rio de Janeiro	Benito Juárez Creates the Rurales (Mexican rural police)	Railway construction begins in Mexico.	Domingo Faustino Sarmiento president of Argentina

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- 17 Translator's note: The Day of Sorrows was the Friday before Good Friday. Vatican Council II decided to remove it from the liturgical calendar since it duplicated the feast day of Our Lady of Sorrows, September 15.
- 18 Translator's note: Reference to the 1833 Revolution of the Restorers, which defeated the governor, Juan Ramón Balcarce, and established Juan Manuel de Rosas' dominion over the province of Buenos Aires.
- 19 Translator's note: A rectangular piece of fabric or leather wrapped around the back and front of the waist, passed between the legs over the trousers, worn for warmth and protection by farmhands, gauchos, and, in general, by the humbler elements of society, the prosperous preferring to wear the traditional short Spanish trousers called *calzón corto español*.
- 20 Translator's note: Azul was located south of the province of Buenos Aires.
- 21 Translator's note: Matasiete = Killed seven. In Lunfardo, *matahambre* means "a dead man"; "*matahambre*" or "*matambre*" is also a typical Argentine dish that translates as "rolled flank steak."
- 22 Translator's note: "Franciscan Saint and Patron of the Blacks and Mulattos of Buenos Aires," in Evelyn Picon Garfield and Iván A. Schulman, *Las literaturas hispánicas: introducción a su estudio* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1991, 146).
- 23 Spanish: "verga." According to literary critics Burgos and Salessi, *El Matadero*, the term refers to the use of sodomy as a form of torture employed by the Federalists. In the story, the "verga" is clearly a whip, specifically an *arreador*, used by cowboys, herders, and carters, also called "verga de toro" because the skin of a bull's penis was used to cover its wooden handle (Diccionario Argentino, 1910). In English: "pizzle": a whip made from a bull's penis.

### 3 Race and Citizenship in the New Republics

- 1 Debt peonage tied workers to agricultural estates because the workers were extended a loan (sometimes involuntarily) and then required to work for a specific employer until the loan was paid off. They would often accrue more debt while working, and thus become caught in a cycle of debt.
- 2 People with African and European ancestry.
- 3 At the time Africans made up 40 percent of the island's population.
- 4 Partly due to these pressures, Britain would proclaim emancipation in 1834 for its 668,000 slaves. A system of forced apprenticeships would be abandoned amidst strikes and protests four years later.
- 5 A resident of São Paulo.
- 6 A resident of the northeast.
- 7 Capoeira is an Afro-Brazilian form of dance that invokes self-defense as a part of its form.
- 8 The entire exchange can be found at Maria Eugenia Echenique, Josefina Pelliza de Sagasta, *The Emancipation of Women: Argentina 1876*, translated by the Palouse Translation Project. *Journal of Women's History*, Volume 7, Number 3, Fall 1995, 102–126.

### 4 The Export Boom as Modernity

- 1 Friedman was the Nobel Prize-winning University of Chicago economist who became one of the most important advocates of free market capitalism for Latin America during the 1960s–1980s.
- 2 Clorinda Matto de Turner believed that the largely vegetarian diet consumed by Indians caused their brains to swell, and urged that more meat be introduced into their diets. She was not alone in describing what others called the "tragedy of meat," and in trying to introduce miracle cures to Indian backwardness (Manuel Gamio, the father of Mexican anthropology, later tried to introduce a tortilla made in part from soybeans).